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Appellant Greater Park City Company, a Utah corporation, 
("appellant GPCC"), by and through its counsel Gordon Strachan, 
Esq., and M. Alex Natt, Esq., of the law firm of Strachan & 
Strachan, appeals from the decision of the Utah State Tax 
i 
Commission denying appellant GPCC's Petition for Redetermination of 
Sales Tax collected erroneously from appellant GPCC during the 
periods June 1991 through June 1994 and May 1992 through June 1994, 
prior to the 1994 amendment of the statute following the Court of 
Appeals' decision in 49th Street Galleria v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 860 P.2d 996 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), cert, denied 878 
P.2d 454 (Utah 1994) . 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellant Greater Park City Company ("appellant GPCC") 
operates the Park City Mountain Resort (fka "the Park City Ski 
Area") in Park City, Utah. Appellant GPCC operates the resort on 
approximately 4,000 acres of unfenced land which is open to the 
general public free of charge. During the winter months, appellant 
GPCC sells ski lift tickets to customers desiring to use its ski 
lifts and gondola. The Tax Commission found that: 
Skiers are not permitted to use the ski lifts or gondola 
without purchasing a lift ticket but may go upon the 
premises and use the ski runs if they do not ride upon 
the lift or gondola. 
(R. 2-3) . The general public may go upon the premises to use the 
ski runs, watch ski races, view firework displays, and engage in 
recreational activities without purchasing a lift ticket. 
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Appellant GPCC's other claim for refund concerns tickets for 
summer activities within the Park City Ski Area. The Tax 
Commission found: 
During the summer months, [appellant GPCC] sells tickets 
to use its gondola, Alpine Slide, Miner's Park Amusement 
Rides, and miniature golf course. Individuals are not 
permitted to play miniature golf or ride any of the 
amusements without a ticket, but they may hike or 
participate in other recreational activities within the 
ski area without the payment of a fee. 
(R. 3) . The general public may enter the ski resort to walk, 
mountain bike, or participate in other recreational activities 
without the payment of a fee. No "admission" to the ski area is 
charged, either in the winter or in the summer. 
Instead of adding sales tax to its ticket prices, appellant 
GPCC charges a flat fee and absorbs the cost of sales tax. During 
the refund periods, GPCC paid $3,054,895.36 in sales tax on winter 
ski lift tickets and $185,624.79 on tickets for its summer 
activities. Appellant GPCC now seeks a refund of those taxes on 
the grounds that neither winter ski lift tickets nor summer 
activity tickets were "admissions" as defined by former section 59-
12-103(1)(f) of the Utah Code before the 1994 legislative 
amendment, and therefore were not subject to sales tax. 
This Court, in 49th Street Galleria v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 860 P.2d 996 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) determined that the 
Tax Commission had been erroneously collecting sales tax on 
amusement rides, batting cages, and other activities on the 
Galleria's premises. Because the Galleria did not charge its 
2 
patrons to enter its premises, but only to engage in each activity, 
this Court determined that the Galleria did not charge an 
"admission" fee and hence sales tax could not be collected. 
In response to the Galleria decision, the legislature amended 
the Sales and Use Tax Act in 1994 and for the first time, extended 
sales tax beyond admissions, to "user fees", expressly including 
ski lift passes, effective June 1, 1994. GPCC does not challenge 
the prospective application of the statute as amended. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(e)(ii) and §78-2-2(4)(1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Commission err in deciding that appellant GPCC 
was not the ''taxpayer who paid the tax" and therefore did 
not have the legal standing to claim a refund even though 
section 59-12-107 (1) (a) of the Sales & Use Tax Act 
permits vendors to absorb and pay taxes out of its 
general funds rather than collect and remit each sales 
tax amount collected from its individual customers? 
2. Did the Commission err in deciding that appellant GPCCs 
method of reporting sales tax established that appellant 
GPCC was not the "taxpayer who paid the tax?" 
3. Did the Commission err in deciding that the fact that 
appellant GPCC claimed and retained 1.5% of the tax 
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amount as the vendor discount permitted by Utah Code Ann. 
§59-12-108(3) established that appellant GPCC was not the 
"taxpayer who paid the tax?" (R. 7). 
4. Did the Commission err in deciding that because appellant 
GPCC claimed its share of the Ski Resort Investment 
Incentive appropriation from Utah's General Fund pursuant 
to §59-12-120, established that appellant GPCC was not 
"the taxpayer who paid the tax"? 
5. Were appellant GPCC s activities for which the Tax 
Commission collected sales tax, in fact not taxable, 
because they did not constitute "admissions" under former 
section 59-12-103(1)(f) of the Utah Code. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews the Commission's "interpretation or 
application of law" for correctness without according it any 
deference. Hales Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Audit Division of the 
State Tax Commission of Utah, 842 P.2d 887 (Utah 1992) . This Court 
grants deference to the Commission's factual findings, if supported 
by substantial evidence. Id. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Article VI, section 22 of the Utah Constitution; Sections 59-
12-103(1) (f) , 59-12-110, 59-12-107 (1) (a), Utah Code Ann. (1953, as 
amended); and Utah Admin. Code R865-19S-33(A). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant GPCC, a Utah corporation maintaining its principal 
place of business in Park City, Utah, operates the Park City Ski 
Area. Appellant GPCC operates ski lifts and until recently a 
gondola, as well as an Alpine Slide, miniature golf course, and 
Miner's Park amusement rides on approximately 4,000 acres of 
unfenced land. Guests are not permitted to play miniature golf or 
to ride the gondola, ski lifts, Alpine Slide, or amusement rides 
without a ticket, but the general public is permitted to use the 
ski area premises for other purposes free of charge. Persons 
accompanying those who buy a ticket to ride the ski lifts or 
amusement rides may enter onto the premises free of charge. 
The appellee, the Customer Service Division of the Utah State 
Tax Commission, erroneously collected sales tax from appellant GPCC 
during the relevant three-year period. The Tax Commission 
erroneously concluded that ski lift tickets and summer activity 
tickets at appellant GPCCs Park City Ski Resort were "admissions" 
prior to this Court's decision in 49th Street Galleria v. Utah State 
Tax Commission, 860 P.2d 996 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). This Court's 
unanimous decision makes clear that sales tax paid by appellant 
GPCC was collected in error. 
Appellant GPCC filed a Petition for Redetermination with the 
Tax Commission on October 6, 1994. The Tax Commission denied 
appellant GPCC s Petition by deciding that appellant GPCC was not 
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"the taxpayer who paid the tax" and therefore did not have standing 
to request a refund. Appellant GPCC appeals this decision of the 
Tax Commission. 
NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Prior to July 1, 1994, only "admissions" as defined by Utah 
Code Ann. §59-12-103(1)(f) were subject to sales tax. Effective 
July 1, 1994, the legislature amended §59-12-103(1)(f) and added 
"user fees" to the list of items for which sales tax was to be 
paid. Prior to these July 1994 amendments, this Court, in 4 9th 
Street Galleria v. Utah State Tax Commission, 860 P.2d 996 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993), determined that the Tax Commission had previously 
been erroneously collecting sales tax on paid amusements located 
within the Galleria's premises. This Court determined that tickets 
to these activities did not constitute "admissions" because the Tax 
Commission's interpretation of the term "admission" in Utah 
Administrative Code R865-19-339(A) (1993) : 
speaks in terms of the right to enter a place and not in 
terms of a fee charged to use facilities or equipment 
within a place. 
49th Street Galleria at 1000. 
Appellant GPCC did not charge persons "for the right to enter 
a place", but instead only charged its customers to ride its ski 
lifts, Alpine Slide, children's rides, or play miniature golf. 
Therefore, ski lift tickets, amusement ride tickets and miniature 
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golf tickets at appellant GPCC s Park City Ski Area were not 
"admissions" under former Utah Code Ann. Sec 59-12-103(1) (f) . 
On October 6, 1994, appellant GPCC filed a Petition for 
Redetermination seeking a refund of sales tax erroneously collected 
from June 1991 through June 1994. (R. 256). On March 22, 1996, 
the Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 209). On June 19, 1996, 
appellant GPCC filed a Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
(R. 73) . A Formal Hearing was held on July 29, 1996 and the 
Commission published its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Final Decision on January 30, 1997. (R. 8). The Tax Commission 
decided that appellant GPCC "is not entitled to any refunds" (R. 
13) and accordingly denied its claims. The Tax Commission failed 
to reach the issue of whether the sales tax collected from 
appellant GPCC was collected erroneously. Instead, the Tax 
Commission determined that appellant GPCC did not have standing to 
claim a refund because it was not "the taxpayer who paid the tax" 
even though it filed all sales tax returns and issued checks to the 
Tax Commission. Appellant GPCC herein appeals this decision. 
The Tax Commission's decision that appellant GPCC has no 
standing is fundamental error. The Sales and Use Tax Act, case 
law, and the Tax Commission's own rules all recognize appellant 
GPCC as "the taxpayer who paid the tax" regardless of whether it 
actually absorbs and pays the taxes or collects and remits the tax. 
7 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has determined that an entity has 
standing if it has suffered "a distinct and palpable injury that 
gives rise to a personal stake in the outcome of the dispute." 
National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Board of State Lands, 8 69 
P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1993). Appellant GPCC suffered a distinct and 
palpable injury when the Commission erroneously collected sales 
tax. The Commission's decision that appellant GPCC lacks standing 
because it was not the "taxpayer who paid the tax" is erroneous. 
The Tax Commission's conclusion is thrice wrong: (1) appellant 
GPCC is the taxpayer even though it exercised its option under Utah 
Code Ann. §59-12-107 (1) (a) to absorb and pay sales taxes itself 
rather than separately collecting and remitting the taxes; (2) 
appellant GPCC is the taxpayer because the Sales and Use Tax Act, 
case law and Tax Commission Rules all recognize appellant GPCC as 
the taxpayer regardless of whether it actually absorbed and payed 
the taxes; and (3) the plain language of the refund provision, Utah 
Code Ann. §59-12-110, entitles appellant GPCC to receive any refund 
as appellant GPCC was the "taxpayer" submitting the return and 
paying the sales tax. (R. 7). 
Appellant GPCC is the taxpayer who paid the sales taxes in 
question; GPCC has a personal, substantial financial stake in the 
outcome of the litigation; and therefore, the Commission's decision 
to deny appellant GPCC standing was clearly erroneous. The 
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Commission erred in failing to reach the merits of appellant GPCC s 
Petition by wrongfully deciding that appellant GPCC did not have 
standing to claim a refund of sales taxes erroneously collected. 
Prior to its amendment in 1994, the Utah Sales & Use Tax Act 
imposed sales taxes on charges for "admission to any place of 
amusement, entertainment, or recreation . . ." The statute imposed 
two requirements for a charge to be taxable: (1) it must have been 
for admission to a place; and (2) the place of admission must have 
been a place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation. Appellant 
GPCC s tickets for ski lifts and summer activities were not taxable 
under former Utah Code Ann. §59-12-103(1)(f) because they failed 
the first part of the statutory test: the tickets were "user fees" 
for chairlifts, rides and games, and not for "admission" into the 
ski area.1 The only "place" at issue, the Park City Ski Area, was 
always open to the general public free of charge. All Utah 
authority construing former section 59-12-103(1)(f) concluded that 
an "admission" under the statute is a fee for the right or 
privilege to enter into a particular place. Only now with the 1994 
amendment is the tax properly imposed on the sale of a ticket for 
a ride upon a mechanical device (such as a ski lift) as a "user 
Whether the Park City Ski Area satisfied the second statutory 
requirement (i.e., was a place of amusement) is not at issue in 
this case. Even if the ski area was a place of amusement, that 
fact alone does not justify imposition of the tax. Both statutory 
requirements had to be satisfied. The ski area must have been a 
place of amusement, and GPCC must have charged people for admission 
into the ski area. 
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fee." Before the 1994 amendments, the "sale of a ticket for a 
ride" was not an "admission" to place of amusement according to 
this Court's decision in 49th Street Galleria. Since appellant 
GPCC's tickets granted only the right to ride ski lifts or to 
participate in other activities, they were not "admissions". 
States with statutes similar to Utah's pre-1994 statute have 
all concluded that ski lift tickets are not "admissions." The 1989 
Ski Resorts Capital Investment Incentive Act did not conflict with, 
alter or amend the requirement that lift tickets are taxable only 
if they involve the right or privilege to enter a place. In 
addition, the Tax Commission's past practice of taxing all of 
appellant GPCC s activities does not trump the statutory 
requirement that in order to be an admission, a lift ticket must 
involve the right or privilege to enter a place. 
Charges cannot be "admissions" if the facts show that the 
place at issue is open to the general public free of charge. 4 9th 
Street Galleria v. Utah State Tax Commission, supra. In 49th Street 
Galleria. this Court held that charges for batting cages, laser 
tag, and skating were not "admissions" under former section 59-12-
103(1)(f) because the premises where these activities occurred were 
open to the public free of charge. Judge Orme, writing for a 
unanimous panel, stated that: 
[t]here is simply no fee charged by the Galleria for 
admission to any place: there are only fees charged to do 
particular things. Thus, given the Tax Commission's own 
interpretation of the statute, as memorialized in its 
10 
rule, its decision in this case [imposing the sales tax] 
was incorrect. 
.Id. If the Galleria had charged people to enter its facility, 
those charges would have constituted "admissions," and would have 
been subject to sales tax. 49th Street Galleria at 1000. 
The same criteria apply in determining whether a ski lift 
ticket is an "admission." If the particular ski area is open to 
the general public free of charge, the lift ticket itself does not 
involve the right to enter that place and is not an "admission." 
The Park City Ski Area charges no fee for admission to any place: 
there are only fees charged to participate in certain activities. 
These fees are not "admissions." Therefore, taxes collected on 
revenues derived from these activities during the relevant period 
were collected erroneously and must be refunded to appellant GPCC. 
In 1994, the Utah legislature amended Utah Code Ann. §59-12-
102 and 103 after this Court handed down its opinion in 49th Street 
Galleria. The amendments extended sales taxes for the first time, 
beyond "admissions" to "user fees." Appellant GPCC objects to any 
attempt to apply the amended statute retroactively. Utah law 
prohibits the retroactive application of these 1994 amendments. 
State v. Abevtar 852 P.2d 993 (Utah 1993). The 1994 amendments 
cannot be applied retroactively because (i) the amendments do not 
expressly provide for retroactive application; (ii) the amendments 
were promulgated with a future effective date; and (iii) the Tax 
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Commission recognized that the tax liabilities created by the 
amendments applied only from July 1, 1994 onward. 
The only exception for this rule of nonretroactivity is for 
"statutes that are procedural or remedial in nature." Abeyta at 
995. The 1994 amendments are neither procedural nor remedial; they 
affect substantive rights. Washington National Insurance Co. v. 
Sherwood Associates, 795 P.2d 665, 668 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). If 
there were any doubt, Utah courts draw the boundaries of the 
nonretroactivity exception "narrowly." Salt Lake Therapy Clinic v. 
Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1019, (Utah 1995). Utah courts usually 
find that most amendments affect substantive rights, and cannot 
therefore be applied retroactively. Washington National Insurance 
at 668 n. 6. 
Because the 1994 amendments create new tax liabilities where 
none existed before, substantive, rather than procedural rights are 
implicated. Rocky Mountain Thrift v. Salt Lake City, 784 P.2d 459, 
462 (Utah 1989) . The Commission has acknowledged that the 1994 
amendments extended the tax to previously untaxed activities. In 
its Tax Bulletin 15-94 the Commission states that "[m]any of the 
above-listed items currently are subject to sales tax." (R.95). 
The 1994 amendments affect "substantive rights", are not merely 
"procedural and remedial", and cannot be applied retroactively. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT GPCC HAS STANDING TO REQUEST A REFUND BECAUSE IT IS 
THE "TAXPAYER WHO PAID THE TAX." 
In its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final 
Decision, the Commission ruled that appellant GPCC did not have 
standing to request a refund because it was not the "taxpayer who 
paid the tax." With that erroneous conclusion, the Commission did 
not even address the merits of appellant GPCC's appeal: that the 
monies collected from appellant GPCC as sales tax during the period 
in question were not taxable because they did not constitute 
"admissions." This Court must review the Commission's legal 
conclusions for correctness without according them any deference. 
Hales Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Audit Division of the State Tax 
Commission of Utah, 842 P.2d 887 (Utah 1992). 
An entity has standing if it has suffered distinct and 
palpable injuries giving rise to a personal stake in the outcome of 
the dispute. National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Board of State 
Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1993). Appellant GPCC suffered a 
distinct and palpable injury when the Tax Commission collected from 
appellant GPCC sales taxes on ski lift tickets and tickets for its 
summer activities. Appellant GPCC is the taxpayer because it paid 
the taxes. Utah law permits a business to absorb and pay sales 
taxes itself, or to collect the taxes from customers and remit 
those funds to the state. Appellant GPCC elected to absorb and pay 
the sales taxes; it did not collect and remit the taxes. 
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The Tax Commission's conclusion that appellant GPCC lacks 
standing because it was not the "taxpayer" who paid the tax is 
mistaken. A party asserting standing must demonstrate only one of 
the following: 
(i) a personal stake in the controversy and some causal 
relationship between the injury, the governmental 
actions, and the relief requested; (ii) that no other 
party has a greater interest in the outcome of the case 
and the issues are unlikely to be raised at all unless 
the present party has standing to raise them; or (iii) 
that the issues are of such great public importance that 
they ought to be decided in furtherance of the public 
interest. 
Archer v. Board of State Lands & Forestry, 907 P.2d 1142, 1145 
(Utah 1995) (quoting Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d at 1150-51). 
Because the Tax Commission erroneously collected $3,240,520.17 from 
appellant GPCC, appellant GPCC has a personal stake in the 
controversy. The Commission's decision to deny appellant GPCC 
standing and avoid the merits of the claimed refund is contrary to 
law and should be reversed by this Court. 
The following section explains that (1) appellant GPCC is the 
taxpayer because it exercised its option under Utah law to absorb 
and pay sales taxes itself rather than collecting the taxes 
separately from its customers and remitting the taxes; (2) 
appellant GPCC is the taxpayer because the Sales and Use Tax Act, 
case law and Tax Commission Rules all recognize appellant GPCC as 
the taxpayer regardless of whether it actually absorbs and pays the 
taxes; and (3) the plain language of the refund provision, Utah 
Code Ann. §59-12-110, entitles appellant GPCC to receive any refund 
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regardless of whether appellant GPCC is labeled a "taxpayer". As 
such, if appellant GPCC is the taxpayer who paid the taxes in 
question, it has a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation, 
and the Commission's decision to deny appellant GPCC standing 
constitutes clear error. 
A. The Utah Supreme Court has held, the Legislature 
has codified, and the Tax Commission has 
acknowledged that businesses may absorb and pay 
sales tax rather than collect and remit it. 
Utah law authorizes a business to choose whether it will 
absorb and pay sales tax out of its general revenues or collect and 
remit it. Section 58-12-107 (1) (a) of the Sales & Use Tax Act 
requires that "[e]ach vendor shall pay or collect and remit the 
sales taxes imposed by this chapter." (emphasis added). The 
legislature's use of the disjunctive "or" demonstrates its intent 
to give vendors a choice: they may either "pay" the sales tax or 
"collect and remit" the sales tax. This language is not an 
accident; it reflects the deliberate decision to codify the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in Robert H. Hinckley, Inc. v. State Tax 
Comm'nr 404 P.2d 662 (Utah 1965) and other cases. 
In Hinckley, a vending machine company appealed a deficiency 
assessed against it for failing to pay sales tax on vending machine 
sales of candy and food. Each of the vendor's individual sales 
totaled less than 15 cents and the Tax Commission's bracket system 
stated that no tax was due on sales of 14 cents or less. The Tax 
Commission also had a rule which declared it: 
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unlawful for the vendor to absorb or in any way waive the 
collection or imposition of the tax or to consider that 
the tax is included and collected as part of the sales 
price. 
Id. at 664 (quoting former Sales Tax Regulation No. 5) . Thus, the 
vendor in Hinckley claimed it was impossible for him to aggregate 
his sales and absorb the sales tax out of that aggregated amount. 
The Utah Supreme Court rejected the argument that a vendor 
cannot absorb or pay the sales tax himself: 
Nor has our attention been called to any provision of our 
Sales Tax Act which makes it unlawful or prohibits a 
vendor from absorbing or paying the tax himself, if he so 
chooses. It does not necessarily follow from the [] 1937 
amendment . . . that the legislature intended to prohibit 
or make it unlawful for a vendor to absorb or pay the tax 
himself. 
Id. at 663. See also J. Henry Jones Co. v. Smith, 494 P.2d 526, 27 
Utah 2d 225 (1972) ("It is, of course, true as defendant argues 
that the parties may contract that the seller will absorb and pay 
the sales tax."). 
After the Hinckley and J. Henry Jones decisions, the 
legislature amended the Sales Tax act to include the choice 
described above - - i.e., that a vendor shall either "pay or 
collect and remit" the sales tax. In addition, the Tax Commission 
eliminated the language from former Rule No. 5 which made it 
unlawful for a vendor to absorb the sales tax. See Utah Admin. 
Code R865-19S-4. 
In short, the Utah Supreme Court has held, the legislature has 
codified, and the Tax Commission has acknowledged that a business 
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may absorb and pay the sales tax rather than collecting and 
remitting it. 
B. Appellant GPCC elected to absorb and pay sales 
taxes on its lift tickets and summer activities and 
did not collect that tax from its customers. 
For the June 1991 through June 1994 period for which appellant 
GPCC seeks a refund of erroneously assessed taxes, GPCC did not 
collect tax from its patrons, but instead absorbed and paid the tax 
itself in accordance with the Utah Supreme Court's opinions in 
Hinckley and J. Henry Jones, the legislature's directive in §59-12-
107(1) (a), and the Tax Commission's revised rules. As the Tax 
Commission correctly decided, appellant GPCC charged its customers 
a flat fee for the right to ride a ski lift, play a round of 
miniature golf, or ride the gondola. (R. 10) . No tax was added to 
the ticket prices charged to customers. (R. 10) . No sales tax was 
collected from customers. Appellant GPCC paid the sales taxes out 
of its general funds. 
The Tax Commission opined that the accounting method employed 
by appellant GPCC to ascertain its sales tax liability indicates 
that appellant GPCC "believed" that it was collecting and remitting 
sales tax rather than absorbing and paying the sales tax. (R. 18) . 
If this Court determines that sales tax on rides was indeed due for 
the three year period prior to the 1994 amendment, the fact that 
appellant GPCC calculated and paid its sales tax burden on net 
sales rather than gross sales may only mean that appellant GPCC may 
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have miscalculated its sales tax. Appellant GPCC's use of this 
method does not indicate, as the Commission claims, that appellant 
GPCC did not "believe" itself the taxpayer who paid the tax. 
The Commission states: 
Instead, the methods used by Petitioner [GPCC] are a very 
common method, and a method which has been accepted by 
the Commission in prior cases, for calculating the amount 
of sales tax collected from the customers. However, it 
clearly does not mean that the vendor is the party paying 
the tax. 
(R. 18) . In reality, the accounting method employed does not 
indicate anything about appellant GPCC's ability to claim a refund 
in the case at bar. The Commission states that "[the accounting 
method employed] clearly does not mean that the vendor is the party 
paying the tax." (R. 18). However, neither does it mean that the 
vendor is not the party paying the tax. The accounting method 
employed by appellant GPCC can be used to determine the amount of 
sales tax apparently due, regardless of whether that tax was to be 
paid out of appellant GPCC's general funds, or collected and 
remitted from a vendor's customers. The Commission's conclusion 
that appellant GPCC was not the "taxpayer who payed the tax" 
because of its use of this accounting method is not based upon 
substantial evidence. 
Because appellant GPCC paid the taxes at issue it is the 
taxpayer. The Tax Commission correctly determined that "Petitioner 
was the taxpayer who filed the sales and use tax returns. . ." (R. 
18 
14) . Therefore, appellant GPCC has standing and is entitled to 
receive any refund. 
C. Appellant GPCC is the "Taxpayer" Because The 
Statute, The Utah Supreme Court, and the Tax 
Commission Rules Recognize It As Such. 
Even if appellant GPCC had not elected to absorb and pay the 
sales tax and instead collected and remitted itf the Sales & Use 
Tax Actf the Utah Supreme Court, and the Tax Commission rules all 
recognize that appellant GPCC is considered a "taxpayer." Section 
59-12-110(7) of the Sales & Use Tax Act prescribes the procedure if 
any underpayment of sales tax is discovered. 
The deficiencies in tax, together with penalties and 
interest imposed by this section, shall be due and 
payable by the taxpayer within ten days after notice and 
demand by the commission . . ." 
It is clear that the legislature did not intend for this provision 
to impose deficiencies and penalties on customers for under 
payments shown in the records of a vendor. The "taxpayer" is the 
business which actually filed the tax return. The Sales & Use Tax 
Act never uses the term "taxpayer" to refer to consumers purchasing 
goods and services, but only to refer to the entity who actually 
signs the tax return and pays the sales tax to the state. 
Not only does the legislature define the "taxpayer" as the 
business which actually files the Sales and Use Tax returns, but 
the Utah Supreme Court also has held that vendors and tax return 
filing businesses are "taxpayers." See, e.g., Hales Sand & Gravel, 
Inc. v. Auditing Div. of the State of Utah, 842 P.2d 887 (Utah 
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1992) (seller of sand and gravel referred to as "taxpayer") ; 
Tummurru Trades, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 802 P.2d 715 (Utah 
1990) (seller of goods to out of state purchasers referred to as 
"taxpayer"); State ex rel Rollv v. I.M.C. Mint Corp.. 610 P.2d 1265 
(Utah 1980) (business referred to as "taxpayer" in action to secure 
position for collection of back sales taxes on business's sales). 
Even the Tax Commission recognizes that the business which 
files the return is the "taxpayer." Under Rule 865-19S-12(A), 
every vendor must file a signed Form TC-71A - a sales tax return. 
"Each return must be signed by the taxpayer or an authorized 
agent." (emphasis added). 
In this case, individual customers at the Park City Ski Area 
do not sign and file sales tax returns. Appellant GPCC signs and 
files sales tax returns. (R. 14) . Under the tax statutes, the 
case law and the Tax Commission's own rules, forms and returns, 
appellant GPCC is the taxpayer. 
Nor is there anything factually, legally or equitably 
questionable about designating a business such as appellant GPCC as 
the "taxpayer" entitled to a refund. If a mistake results in an 
underpayment to the Commission, appellant GPCC is liable for that 
payment, plus interest and penalties. Thus, it is entirely fair 
and equitable that when an error results in an overpayment, 
appellant GPCC is entitled to the refund as the "taxpayer". 
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Other states that have examined this issue have held that 
standing to claim a refund lies with the person on whom the "legal 
incidence" or legal burden of the sales tax falls. E.g. Reimann v. 
Huddleston, 883 S.W.2d 135 (Tenn. App. 1993)(only sellers had 
standing to sue state for refund because legal burden fell on 
sellers, and consumers' only burden was economic). In addition, as 
described above, both the legal and the economic burden fell on 
appellant GPCC in this case. 
The Utah Sales & Use Tax Act is designed to place the economic 
burden of the tax on the transaction of sale or use. The legal 
burden to pay the tax falls squarely on vendors like appellant 
GPCC. Because the legal burden of the tax falls on appellant GPCC, 
it is the taxpayer with standing to seek the refund. Because 
appellant GPCC actually absorbed and paid the taxes itself, there 
is no inequity in refunding overpayments to GPCC. 
D. The Refund Statute, Utah Code Ann. §59-12-110(2), 
Requires That Any Refund Must be Paid to GPCC. 
The refund of erroneously collected sales taxes is governed by 
Utah Code Ann. §59-12-110(2), which provides: 
If any tax, penalty or interest has been 
erroneously collected or computed, the commission shall 
credit it on any amounts then due from that person to the 
state . . ., and the balance shall be refunded to that 
person or his successors , administrators, executors, or 
assigns. 
The statute uses only the word "person" to designate whom is 
entitled to receive any refund. Nowhere in the Sales & Use Tax Act 
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is the term "person" restricted to "purchasers." If the 
legislature had intended to restrict refunds only to "purchasers," 
it would have used that term. There is no reason to construe the 
term "person" as referring exclusively to purchasers and not to 
vendors such as appellant GPCC. In fact, as used elsewhere in the 
same section, the term "person" refers solely to persons filing 
sales tax returns - i.e., vendors like GPCC. 
The plain language of the refund provision is also supported 
by common sense. If refunds were restricted exclusively to 
purchasers, the refund provision would be virtually meaningless. 
The average purchaser would never be able to pursue a refund 
because the cost of pursuit would be prohibitive in comparison to 
the small individual refund most purchasers would receive. 
II. APPELLANT GPCC'S TICKETS FOR SKI LIFTS, ALPINE SLIDE, GONDOLA 
RIDES, MINIATURE GOLF AND LITTLE MINER'S PARK RIDES WERE NOT 
TAXABLE AS ADMISSIONS UNDER FORMER UTAH CODE ANN. §59-12-
103(1)(f). 
Prior to its amendment in 1994, the Utah Sales & Use Tax Act 
imposed sales taxes on charges for "admission to any place of 
amusement, entertainment, or recreation . . ." The statute imposed 
two requirements for a charge to be taxable: (1) it must have been 
for admission to a place; and (2) the place of admission must have 
been a place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation. 
Appellant GPCCs tickets for ski lifts and summer activities 
were not taxable under former Utah Code Ann. §59-12-103(1)(f) 
because they did not meet the first part of the former statutory 
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test: the tickets were user fees for chairlifts, rides and games, 
and not for admission into the ski area.2 The Park City Ski Area 
was always open to the general public free of charge. 
The following sections explain why Appellant GPCC's winter and 
summer activity tickets did not qualify as "admissions." First, 
every Utah authority to construe former section 59-12-103(1)(f) has 
concluded that an "admission" is a fee for the right or privilege 
to enter into a particular place. Since Appellant GPCC's tickets 
involve only the right to ride ski lifts or participate in other 
activities, they are not admissions. 
Second, every state with a similar statute has held that ski 
lift tickets are not admissions. See Ski Acres v. Kittitas County, 
827 P.2d 100 (Wash. 1992) (ski lift tickets not taxable because the 
plain meaning of "admission" contemplates a fee for entering a 
place), State Board of Equalization v. Jackson Hole Ski 
Corporation, 737 P.2d 350 (Wyo. 1987) (tax commission's attempt to 
tax ski lift tickets as admissions failed because Jackson Hole did 
not charge customers to enter their premises); See also City of Sun 
Vallev v. Sun Valley Co., 851 P.2d 961 (Idaho 1993). 
2 
Whether the Park City Ski Area satisfied the second statutory 
requirement (i.e., was a place of amusement) is not at issue in 
this case. Even if the ski area was a place of amusement, that 
fact alone does not justify imposition of the tax. Both statutory 
requirements had to be satisfied. The ski area must have been a 
place of amusement, and GPCC must have charged people for admission 
into the ski area, which it did not. 
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Third, the Ski Resorts Capital Investment Incentive Act did 
not conflict with, alter or amend the requirement that lift tickets 
are taxable only if, under the facts of each case, they involve the 
right to enter a place. And fourth, the Tax Commission's past 
practice of taxing all of appellant GPCC's activities does not 
trump the statutory requirement that in order to be an admission, 
a lift ticket must involve the right or privilege to enter a place. 
A. Every Utah Authority to Construe Former Section 59-
12-103(1) (F) Has Concluded That An Admission Under 
The Statute Is A Fee For The Right Or Privilege To 
Enter Into A Particular Place. 
The plain meaning of the term "admission" is: permission or 
right to enter a place. Every Utah authority which construed 
former section 59-12-103(1) (f) found that the legislature used the 
term "admission" in its common and ordinary sense. A ticket is an 
"admission" only if it includes the right or privilege to enter a 
place. A ticket for the use of equipment or to participate in an 
activity at a place which is already open to the public free of 
charge is not an "admission", but a user fee. 
1. In 49th Street Galleria v. Tax CommissionP the 
Utah Court of Appeals held that a charge was 
taxable as an admission only if paying for the 
right or privilege to enter a place. 
An "admission" is a fee charged for the right or privilege to 
enter a particular place which is not accessible to the general 
public free of charge. 49th Street Galleria v. Tax Commission, 860 
P.2d 996, 1000 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) cert, denied 878 P.2d 454 (Utah 
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1994) . Additionally, "the terms of [the] statute should be 
interpreted in accord with usually accepted meanings, Utah law 
dictates that Nx[i]n construing legislative enactments, the reviewer 
assumes that each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus the 
statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is 
unreasonably confused or inoperable." Savage Indus., Inc. v. Tax 
Comm'n. 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991). 
In order to determine whether a fee is an "admission" or 
simply a user fee, one must first know whether the place involved 
is open to the public free of charge, or whether entrance is 
restricted to those who pay a fee. Charges cannot be "admissions" 
if "no fee is charged for the right or privilege to enter" a place. 
49th Street Galleria at 1000. In 49th Street Galleria, this Court 
unanimously held that charges for batting cages, laser tag, and 
skating were not "admissions" under former section 59-12-
103(1) (f) (the very section at issue in this case) because the facts 
showed that the premises where these activities occurred were 
already open to the public free of charge. Id. 
The same criteria apply in determining whether a ski lift 
ticket is an "admission." If the particular ski area is open to 
the general public free of charge, the lift ticket itself does not 
involve the right to enter a place and is not an "admission." If 
the ski resort requires a lift ticket in order to enter onto its 
premises, the ticket might be an "admission." In this case, the 
Tax Commission found that: 
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. Petitioner [GPCC] sells ski lift tickets to 
customers desiring to use the Park City ski lifts and 
gondola. Skiers are not permitted to use the ski lifts 
or gondola without a lift ticket, but may go upon the 
premises and use the ski runs if they do not ride upon 
the lift or gondola. 
(R. 9-10). 
The determination of whether or not a ski lift pass is an 
"admission" or merely a user fee cannot be made in a vacuum. That 
determination can only be made by examining the facts surrounding 
the operation of the individual ski resort. Some ski resorts may 
require ski lift passes simply to enter onto their premises. 
Others, such as the Park City Ski Area, may leave their premises 
open to the public, and charge only for the use of their ski lifts. 
Thus, lift tickets at appellant GPCCs Park City Ski Area are not 
"admissions" under former section 59-12-103 (1) (f) . 
2. The Utah Sales Tax Commission has interpreted 
"admission" to mean the right or privilege to 
enter into a particular place. 
The Utah State Tax Commission interpreted the term "admission" 
from former section 59-12-103 (1) (f) in Rule R865-19S-33(A) . That 
rule states: 
"Admission" means the right or privilege to enter into a 
place. Admission includes the amount paid for the right 
to use a reserved seat or any seat in an auditorium, 
theater, circus, stadium, schoolhouse, meeting house, or 
gymnasium to view any type of entertainment. Admission 
also includes the right to use a table at a night club, 
hotel or roof garden whether such charge is designated as 
a cover charge, minimum charge, or any such similar 
charge. 
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Utah Admin. Code R865-19S-33(A). This interpretation, which was 
approved by this Court in 49th Street Galleria, also requires that 
a charge must be for the privilege to enter a place in order to 
qualify as an "admission." 
Rule R865-19S-33(A) is the Tax Commission's only direct 
interpretation of the term "admission." The Division argues that 
a fragment of another Rule, R865-19S-34, should also be treated as 
an interpretation of the term "admission." However, just as with 
statutes, rules are to be read in their entirety. Reading the 
portion of Rule R865-19S-34 relied upon by the Division in 
conjunction with the rest of the Rule provides an excellent 
demonstration of the purpose behind that fundamental axiom of 
construction. The Rule states: 
A. The phrase "place of amusement, entertainment, or 
recreation" is broad in meaning but conveys the 
basic idea of a definite location. 
B. The amount paid for an admission to such a place is 
subject to the tax, even though such charge 
includes the right of the purchaser to participate 
in some activity within the place. For example, 
the sale of a ticket for a ride upon a mechanical 
or self-operated device is an admission to a place 
of amusement. 
Utah Admin. Code R865-19S-34. 
Read in context, it is obvious that in Rule 865-19S-34, the 
Tax Commission was construing the term "place of amusement," and 
not the term "admission." But, whether the Park City Ski Area 
satisfies the statutory requirement of a "place of amusement" is 
relevant only if its lift tickets and summer activity tickets 
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qualify as "admissions." See 49th Street Galleria, 860 P.2d at 1000 
n. 13. Since GPCC's tickets do not satisfy the meaning of 
"admission," it is irrelevant whether the Park City Ski Area is a 
"place of amusement."' 
The example used by the Division demonstrates the error in 
trying to claim that "the sale of a ticket for a ride upon a 
mechanical or self-operated device is an admission to a place of 
amusement." Utah Admin Code R865-19S-34. Only now with the 1994 
amendment is the tax properly imposed on the sale of a ticket for 
a ride upon a mechanical device such as a ski lift, as a "user 
fee." During the three year period at issue, before the 1994 
amendment, the "sale of a ticket for a ride" was not an "admission 
to a place of amusement" according to 49th Street Galleria. 
3. The Barrett decision did not purport to 
construe the term "admissions" or hold as a 
matter of law that lift tickets at all ski 
resorts are "admissions." 
The Division mischaracterizes Barrett Investment Co. v. State 
Tax Commission of Utah, 15 Utah 2d 97, 387 P.2d 998 (1964), as 
standing for an impossible proposition: that lift tickets at all 
ski resorts are "admissions" under former section 59-12-103(1)(f) 
of the Sales Tax Act as a matter of law. In reality, the Barrett 
court did not consider whether lift tickets were "admissions" at 
the particular resort involved in that case, much less whether lift 
tickets at all resorts were "admissions." In Barrett, the Solitude 
Ski Area stipulated, in light of its operations at that time, that 
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its lift passes were "admissions." See, Plaintiff's Brief, Barrett 
Investment Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, at p. 2. (R. 172). 
Since the particular facts surrounding the operation of the 
Solitude Ski Area do not appear in the record, it is impossible to 
determine whether Solitude was correct in conceding that lift 
tickets at its resort were "admissions." However, it is clear that 
the Utah Supreme Court simply relied on Solitude's stipulation, and 
did not consider at all whether Solitude correctly construed its 
sale of lift tickets as admissions. In Barrett, the sole issue 
before the Court was whether or not Solitude was required to pay 
sales taxes on equipment it purchased out-of-state for the 
construction of new lift towers. Barrett, 387 P.2d at 998. The 
Court did not decide whether Solitude's lift tickets were taxable 
"admissions" as a matter of law, and it certainly did not make a 
sweeping conclusion about lift tickets at Utah's other ski resorts. 
The Division's reliance on Barrett is misplaced; the case is 
simply inapposite. Barrett does not purport to interpret or apply 
former section 59-12-103(1)(f). The holding which the division 
attributes to Barrett far exceeds the actual scope of the case, and 
is wholly inconsistent with the definition of "admission" in former 
section 59-12-103(1) (f) . As demonstrated in 49th Street Galleria, 
one cannot determine whether a lift ticket is an admission without 
looking to the particular resort and examining whether it charges 
for the right to enter its premises or only to ride the ski lifts. 
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B. Each State To Construe A Similar Statue Has Held 
That Lift Tickets Are Not Admissions At Ski Areas 
Where No Ticket Is Necessary To Enter The Area. 
This Court's decision in 49th Street Galleria is not an 
aberration. Many other states have admissions tax statutes similar 
to Utah's former section 59-12-103(1) (f) . Those states which have 
construed their tax statutes have employed a virtually identical 
analysis, and have come to the same conclusion as appellant GPCC 
argues here: a charge is not an "admission," unless it is for the 
privilege to enter a place. If the place can be entered without 
paying any charge, then charges for the use of equipment and 
facilities within the place are not "admissions." 
In Ski Acres Inc. v. Kittitas County, 827 P.2d 100 (Wash. 
1992), the Washington Supreme Court addressed the legality of taxes 
imposed on charges for ski lift passes under a code section similar 
to that involved in the instant case. 3 The Washington statute 
contemplated "an admission charge to any place," just as Utah 
Admin. Code R865-19S-33(A) defined "admission" as "the right or 
privilege to enter into a place." Anticipating the same reasoning 
used by this Court in 49th Street Galleria, the Washington Supreme 
3 
RCW 36.38.010, that statute addressed in Ski Acres provided: 
Any county may by ordinance enacted by its board of 
commissioners, levy and fix a tax of not more than one 
cent on twenty cents or fraction thereof to be paid for 
county purposes by persons who pay an admissions charge 
to any place. . . and require that one who receives any 
admission charge to any place shall collect and remit the 
tax to the county treasurer of the county. . . 
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Court explained thatf "[t]he plain and ordinary meaning of the term 
'admission1 is a fee paid at or for entering."' Id. at 1004. 
The resort in Ski Acres, like appellant GPCC's Park City Ski 
Area, did not charge anyone to enter its premises, but only charged 
for the use of its ski lifts. The Ski Acres Court explained that, 
"A ski lift is not a place," and held that the resort's lift 
tickets were not subject to the sales tax on admissions. Id. at 
1003. 
Other neighboring states have also held that ski lift revenues 
are not taxable as admission charges at resorts where the public 
may enter the ski area free of charge. In State Board of 
Equalization v. Jackson Hole Ski Corporation, 737 P.2d 350 (Wyo. 
1987), Jackson Hole challenged two Wyoming State Tax Commission 
rules which attempted to bring its ski lift passes within that 
state's sales tax on admissions. Wyoming's counterpart to the Utah 
Sales and Use Tax provided in relevant part: 
(a) Except as provided by W.S. 39-6-405, there is 
levied and shall be paid by the purchases on all sales of 
twenty-five cents ($.25) or more an excise tax of three 
percent(3%) upon: 
(viii) The sales price paid for each admission to any 
place of amusement, entertainment, recreation, games, or 
athletic event. 
§39-6-404 (a) (iii) Wyoming Statutes 1977. 
The Wyoming State Tax Commission attempted to extend the reach 
of the sales tax act beyond the legislature's intention by 
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promulgating regulations which purported to render charges for the 
use of ski lifts taxable as admissions. The Wyoming Supreme Court 
found that its Tax Commission's purported regulations unlawfully 
exceeded the scope of that state's sales tax act because ski lift 
tickets at Jackson Hole were not "admissions." The Wyoming Court 
held that the term "admissions in the sales tax act meant "a fee 
paid at or for entering." Id. at 354. Because Jackson Hole Ski 
Corporation, like appellant GPCC, did not charge individuals to 
enter its premises, it did not charge for an "admission." 
Therefore, the Wyoming Tax Commission's regulations exceeded the 
authority granted by the Wyoming legislature in its Sales Tax Act. 
That is the instant case. Section 103(1) (f) of the Utah Sales 
and Use Tax Act permits the Commission to tax only "admissions." 
Just as Jackson Hole Ski Corporation, appellant GPCC does not 
charge fees for admissions to the Park City Ski Area. Rather, the 
fees appellant GPCC charges are for use of its ski lifts and other 
amusements. 
Idaho also follows the rule that ski lift passes are not 
admissions. City of Sun Valley v. Sun Valley Co., 851 P.2d 961 
(Idaho 1993). In Sun Valley, the Idaho Supreme Court construed a 
sales tax statute quite similar to Utah's and decided that: 
Furthermore, the fee for lift tickets cannot be taxed as 
an "admissions charge" to the ski area. Although a ski 
area may be a "place" for purposes of admission, Sinclair 
does not charge for entry into this area. . . Since 
Sinclair does not charge a fee for entering the ski 
areas, the charge for lift tickets is not an "admissions 
charge" under I.C. §63-3612(e). 
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Ill. The Ski Resorts Capital Investment Incentive Act Did Not Alter 
Or Amend The Statutory Requirement That A Lift Ticket Can Be 
Taxed As An Admission Only If It Involves The Right Or 
Privilege To Enter A Place. 
The Division also misinterprets the Ski Resorts Capital 
Investment Incentive Act ("the Act") in arguing that lift tickets 
are taxable at all ski resorts as a matter of law without regard to 
whether they qualify as "admissions." The interpretation urged by 
the Division would place the Act in direct and irreconcilable 
conflict with former section 59-12-103 (1) (f) and 49th Street 
Galleria. In addition, the Division's proposed interpretation 
would render the Act unconstitutional for imposing new taxes and 
amending former section 59-12-103(1)(f) without describing any such 
intention or purpose in its title. 
A. The Division's Interpretation of the Ski Resorts 
Capital Investment Incentive Act Conflicts With 
Former Section 59-12103(1)(f) as Interpreted in 
49th Street Galleria. 
The doctrine of in pari materia requires statutes to be 
construed in harmony with one another when they relate to the same 
subject. Utah County v. Orem City, 699 P.2d 707 (Utah 1985). When 
a statute has already been construed by an appellate court, related 
statutes must also be construed to harmonize with case law 
construing the statute. Id. Former section 59-12-103(1) (f) and 
the Act should be construed in harmony with each other and with any 
relevant case law. 
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The only case construing former section 59-12-103(1)(f) is 
49th Street Galleria. Consequently, the Act should be construed to 
harmonize with both former section 59-12-103(1) (f) and 4 9th Street 
Galleria. Applying the reasoning of 49th Street Galleria to ski 
resorts, it is apparent that a lift ticket is taxable as an 
"admission" only if a ski resort requires a lift ticket to gain 
entry into the ski area. 
Properly read, the Act harmonizes with 49th Street Galleria, 
Barrett, and former Utah Code Ann. §59-12-103(1) (f) . As its title 
suggests, the purpose of the Act was to "provide a limited 
investment incentive." See Laws of Utah - 1989, Chapter 239 at pg. 
721 (R. 199). The Act appropriated from the state's General Fund 
money to provide an investment incentive to resorts for capital 
expenditures. See Utah Code Ann. §59-12-120(1) (1989). 
The allocation of Utah's General Fund appropriation among 
Utah's ski resorts was calculated by determining the amount of 
sales tax paid by each resort as a function of the entire amount of 
sales tax collected from all of Utah's ski resorts. The Act did 
not segregate the sales tax collected from the ski areas and 
maintain this amount separate from the state's General Fund before 
returning a portion of the money collected to the ski areas. 
Instead, sales taxes collected were deposited, without any 
designation or segregation, and then paid out of the General Fund. 
This pre-49th Street Galleria statute merely used the sales tax 
collected (erroneously as it turns out) to divide the appropriated 
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General Fund money among the ski resorts, to purchase new lifts, or 
snowmaking and hill-grooming equipment. 
The Division argues that the Act should be read as necessarily 
implying that a lift ticket is an "admission" regardless of whether 
a ticket is necessary for admittance into the ski area. In other 
words, the Division reads the Act as requiring the Tax Commission 
and the resorts to ignore the statutory scheme established in 
section 59-12-103(1)(f). An interpretation of a provision which 
requires one to disregard another section of the same statute 
violates the doctrine of in pari materia. Under the doctrine of in 
pari materia, the Division's reading of the Ski Resorts Capital 
Investment Incentive Act must be rejected because it does not 
harmonize with former section 59-12-103 (1) (f) and 49th Street 
Galleria, but instead conflicts with them. 
B. The Division's Overly Broad Reading of the Ski 
Resorts Capital Investment Incentive Act Would 
Render that Act Unconstitutional Under Article VI, 
section 22 of the Utah Constitution. 
Before the 1994 amendment of former section 59-12-103 (1) (f), 
lift tickets arguably were taxable as "admissions" in some cases, 
but not in others, depending on whether a ski lift ticket was 
necessary to enter into any particular ski area. Notwithstanding 
the language of former section 59-12-103 (1) (f) , the Division now 
argues that the Act itself somehow rendered lift tickets taxable in 
all cases as a matter of law. In order to have such an effect, the 
Act would have had to impliedly amended former section 
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59-12-103(1)(f) to abolish the requirement of a "right or privilege 
to enter into a place" with respect to ski resorts. That was 
neither the purpose nor the effect of the legislature's decision to 
appropriate funds to stimulate investment at the state's ski areas. 
"[Ajmendments by implication, like repeals by implication, are 
not favored and will not be upheld in doubtful cases nor where they 
raise constitutional questions." Sutherland, Statutory 
Construction §22.13 at page 215. In this case, the Division's 
argument that the Act impliedly extended sales taxes to all ski 
lift tickets raises serious constitutional problems. 
Article VI, section 22 of the Utah Constitution provides in 
part: 
Except general appropriation bills and bills for the 
codification and general revision of laws, no bill shall 
be passed containing more than one subject, which shall 
be clearly expressed in its title. 
Utah Const. Art. VI §22 (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court 
has recognized that requiring a clear description of the subject in 
the title of every act serves "a practical purpose" and is not 
merely "a technical restriction on the legislature." State v 
Kallas, 94 P.2d 414, 419 (Utah 1939). That practical purpose is to 
inform the legislators and the public about the act sufficiently to 
lead potentially interested persons to inquire into the body of the 
legislation to ascertain the exact nature of the law. id. Acts 
which violate this mandate are unconstitutional. See e.g Pass v. 
Kanell, 100 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah 1940) (act which provided for 
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liability of owners of rented cars held unconstitutional because 
its title dealt only with registration of automobiles); Saville v. 
Corless, 151 P. 51, n2 (Utah 1915) (act which had effect of setting 
closing hours for certain business was unconstitutional where 
subject expressed in title was only the regulation of working hours 
of certain employees). 
In assessing the sufficiency of a title, "[t]he test to be 
applied is whether the title imparts enough information to one 
interested in the subject matter to provoke a reading of the act." 
State ex rel. Walton v. Casey, 370 S.E.2d 141, 144 (W.Va. 1988) 
(act which extended licenses to otherwise ineligible physicians, 
but did not indicate such a purpose in its title, was 
unconstitutional) . In this case, the title of the Ski Resorts 
Capital Investment Incentive Act fails to provide enough 
information to provoke a reading of the Act by people interested in 
the imposition or extension of sales taxes. The title reads in its 
entirety: 
AN ACT RELATING TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; PROVIDING A 
LIMITED INVESTMENT INCENTIVE TO SKI RESORTS THAT 
PURCHASE SNOW MAKING EQUIPMENT, SKI SLOPE GROOMING 
EQUIPMENT, OR SKI LIFT TRANSPORTATION; PROVIDING OTHER 
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS. 
Laws of Utah - 1989, Chapter 239 at page 721,(R. 199). Nothing in 
the title suggests any intention to extend the sales tax to, or 
impose a new sales tax on, previously untaxable user fees like lift 
tickets at ski areas open to the general public free of charge. 
The title does not even mention the word "tax." No person 
37 
interested in sales taxes, or in the specific taxability of ski 
lift tickets, would be prompted by the title to read the Act. 
In addition, if the Act was to effectively extend the sales 
tax beyond the statutory definition of "admission," then the title 
would have to refer specifically to the provision which would be 
amended — i.e., former section 59-12-103 (1) (f) . See Salt Lake 
Union Stock Yards v. State Tax Commission. 71 P.2d 538, 541 (Utah 
1937) ("The title to an amendatory act is held sufficient if it 
refers by number to the section of the code or law to be amended 
and declares a purpose to amend the same.") . The title to the Ski 
Resorts Capital Investment Incentive Act contains no reference to 
former section 59-12-103(1)(f), and reflects no intention to amend 
or modify that or any other section in any way. 
Utah law requires that statutes be construed "to avoid 
potential constitutional conflicts." Carlson v. Bos, 740 P. 2d 
1269, 1276 (Utah 1987) (citation omitted) . The construction of the 
Act urged by the Division collides head-on with the title 
requirements of Article VI, section 22 of the Utah Constitution. 
Therefore, the Division's proposed interpretation of the Act must 
be rejected. 
C. The Tax Commission's Past Practice Of Taxing All Of 
GPCC's Tickets Does Not Trump The Statutory 
Requirement That To Be An Admission, A Ticket Must 
Involve The Right Or Privilege To Enter A Place. 
Agency interpretations, whether in formal written rules or 
unwritten practices, affect the construction of a statute only if 
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the statute is ambiguous. Ferro v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, 828 
P.2d 507 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). This Court has already held in 4 9th 
Street Galleria that the language of former section 59-12-103(1)(f) 
"does not contain language which would even arguably constitute an 
explicit grant of discretion to the Tax Commission, the 
commission's action in interpreting the scope of the sales tax on 
"admissions" must be reviewed without deference and for 
correctness." 49th Street Galleria at 999. (emphasis in original). 
Because the statute at issue is clear and unambiguous, neither 
written rules nor unwritten practices (such as taxing all of GPCC's 
activities) can vary the mandate of the statute that an admission 
charge must involve the right to enter into a particular place. 
In addition, "[i]t is a long-standing principle of 
administrative law that an agency's rules must be consistent with 
its governing statutes." Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Tax Comm'n, 84 6 
P.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 1993). If in conflict, the agency's rules 
and interpretations will be invalidated, id. This is particularly 
true of tax statutes, which must be strictly construed against the 
state and in favor of appellant GPCC. If a rule or practice of the 
Tax Commission is out of harmony with the statute, the rule or 
practice is invalid and the statute must control. Id. 
In this case, the Tax Commissions practices with respect to 
appellant GPCC have been out of harmony with the plain language of 
the statute. Former section 59-12-103(1) (f) requires that a ticket 
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involve the right or privilege to enter into a place before it may 
be taxed as an admission. The Tax Commission's practice of 
requiring payment of sales taxes without regard to whether 
appellant GPCC's tickets involve a right or privilege to enter a 
place conflicts with the requirements of former section 
59-12-103(1)(f). Consequently, the statute itself must control, 
and the Tax Commission's prior practices are invalid. 
IV. THE 1994 AMENDMENTS DO NOT DEMONSTRATE A PREVIOUS LEGISLATIVE 
INTENT FOR FORMER SECTION 59-12-103(1) (f) TO TAX LIFT TICKETS 
AND SUMMER ACTIVITIES REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THEY QUALIFIED AS 
ADMISSIONS AND DO NOT APPLY RETROACTIVELY. 
Following this Court's decision in 49th Street Galleria, the 
legislature in 1994 amended Utah Code Ann. §59-12-102 and 103. The 
amendment expressly extended sales taxes, for the first time, 
beyond "admissions" to "user fees." The Division contends that 
this amendment illustrates that the intent of the legislature, over 
sixty years ago when it first adopted the sales tax statute to tax 
lift tickets and summer activities regardless of whether they 
qualify as "admissions." There weren't even ski lifts in Utah in 
1933, much less tickets for their use. Recognizing the weakness of 
that old intent argument, the Division asserts that the 1994 
amendments should be applied retroactively against taxpaying 
appellant GPCC. The following sections explain why that argument 
must also be rejected. 
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A. The 1994 Legislature Did Not Purport To Say That 
Another Legislature Did Not Mean What It Said 60 
Years Earlier When It Enacted The Tax On 
Admissions. 
The Division claims that the 1994 amendments show that the 
legislature which originally enacted the admissions tax in 1933 did 
not mean what it said. However, the Division offers no support in 
the recorded sixty year old legislative history for its claims. 
And, even if the legislature had explicitly stated in 1994 that the 
intent of earlier statutes had always been to tax lift tickets and 
summer activities without regard to whether the were admissions, 
such a statement would carry no value in terms of disclosing the 
legislative intent behind former section 59-12-103(1)(f). 
The retroactive wisdom provided by the subsequent speech 
of a [legislator] stating that yesterday we meant 
something that we did not say is an ephemeral guide to 
history. . . . [MJortals are not free from the temptation 
to endow yesterday with the wisdom found today. 
Rogers v. Frito Lay. Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1080 (5th Cir. 
1980) (rejecting later statements by legislators in construing 
federal Rehabilitation Act) . 
In the instant case, the Division argues that the following 
hypothetical statement should be attributed to the 1994 
legislature: 
Even though the legislature more than 60 years ago stated 
that fees were taxable only if they were for the right 
or privilege to enter a place, that is not what they 
meant. Even though they did not say it, what they 
actually meant over 60 years ago was that some charges, 
such as lift tickets, (even before there were ski lifts) 
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should be taxed regardless of whether they meet the 
statutory criteria. 
This hypothetical statement demonstrates the absurdity of the 
Division1 s argument. The 1994 legislature never purported to make 
such a statement. To attribute such a position to the 1994 
legislature would be contrary to law and utterly without support. 
B. The 1994 Amendments Do Not Apply Retroactively. 
Utah law prohibits the retroactive application of these 1994 
amendments. 
The law is well settled in this state that amendments 
to statutes are prospective only unless expressly made 
retroactive. 
State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993f 995 (Utah 1993) (1989 amendment did 
not apply retroactively because "[t]he amendment to section 77-13-6 
contains no express language of retroactivity") (emphasis added). 
See also Salt Lake Therapy Clinic v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1019 
(Utah 1995) ("general presumption under Utah law that statutes are 
not to be applied retroactively unless there is an express 
provision to the contrary"); Utah Code Ann. §68-3-3 (stating that 
xx[n]o part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless 
expressly so declared") . The only exception to the rule of 
nonretroactivity is "for statutes that are procedural or remedial 
in nature." Abeyta, 852 P.2d at 995. 
The following sections explain why the 1994 amendments cannot 
be applied retroactively. First, the Utah legislature did not 
expressly make the 1994 amendments retroactive. It did the 
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opposite by providing a future effective date of July 1, 1994 for 
the statute. Second, the narrow exception for "procedural or 
remedial'' legislation does not apply because the 1994 amendments 
affected substantive rights, (imposing a new tax as a "user fee") 
rather than merely procedural rights. 
C. The 1994 Amendments do not expressly provide for 
retroactivity. 
The 1994 amendments do not expressly provide for retroactive 
application. In fact, the legislation provided exactly the 
opposite. Section 3 of Senate Bill No. 191 stated: "This act takes 
effect on July 1, 1994." Laws of Utah - 1994, Chapter 210, § 3. 
No Utah court has ever held a statute to be retroactive in the 
face of the clear legislative mandate that the statute take effect 
upon a specified future date. It would be senseless for the 
legislature to provide a future effective date for legislation 
which applied retroactively. On the contrary, the Utah Supreme 
Court has relied upon a legislatively provided future effective 
date in finding that a statute applied only prospectively. In 
National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Board of State Lands, 8 69 
P.2d 909 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court rejected the Division 
of State Lands and Forestry's argument that Utah Code Ann. §78-2-
2(3)(e)(iii) applied retroactively. In that case, involving a 
dispute over the sale of state lands around the Burr Trail, the 
Court noted that, ,f[b]y its terms, §78-2-2(3) (e) (iii) did not take 
effect until April 25, 1988, after the petition for review was 
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filed." The Court held that the statute at issue could only be 
applied prospectively. 
This case presents the same situation the Utah Supreme Court 
faced in National Parks & Conservation Ass'n. The legislature 
provided that the amendments to sections 59-12-102 and 103 did not 
take effect until July 1, 1994f after GPCC had initiated the refund 
process before the Tax Commission. Even the Tax Commission itself 
now has recognized that the new tax liabilities created by the 1994 
amendments applied only from July 1, 1994 onward. In Tax Bulletin 
15-94, the Commission listed the activities which would become 
taxable under the new amendments, and explained: 
All other businesses charging admissions or user fees 
must be prepared to collect sales tax on July 1, 1994. 
Likewise, state and local government entities must be 
prepared, beginning July 1, 1994, to collect sales tax on 
all admissions and user fees previously not subject to 
tax. 
See Tax Bulletin 15-94, (R. 95)(emphasis added). The "user fees 
not previously subject to tax" are the taxes on the ski lift 
tickets now correctly imposed and paid by appellant GPCC. But 
these taxes became due after July 1, 1994. The 1994 amendments are 
not retroactive because the legislature did not expressly make them 
retroactive — it made those amendments effective "beginning July 
1, 1994." Appellant GPCC is entitled to a refund for the period 
(July 1, 1991 through June 30, 1994) before the effective date of 
the new statute on July 1, 1994. 
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D. The 1994 amendments were substantive and not merely 
procedural or remedial. 
Utah law provides one narrow exception to the rule against 
retroactive legislation: a statute which is "procedural or remedial 
in nature" may be applied retroactively. State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 
993, 995 (Utah 1993)(amendment to plea statute substantive rather 
than procedural); Salt Lake Therapy Clinic v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 
1017, 1020 (Utah 1995) (new statute preventing disclosure of 
confidential information would not be applied retroactively). 
However, a statute which affects substantive rights cannot be 
applied retroactively. Washington National Insurance Co. v. 
Sherwood Associates, 795 P.2d 665, 668 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
In order to determine whether an amendment may be applied 
retroactively, one must first determine whether the amendment 
"affects a substantive right or merely a procedural one." Id. The 
practice of Utah courts has been to draw the boundaries of the 
exception "narrowly." Salt Lake Therapy Clinic, 890 P.2d at 1020 
n. 3, and to find that most amendments affect substantive rights. 
Washington National Insurance, 795 P.2d at 668 n.6 ("Utah courts 
have usually held that a statutory change affected substantive 
rights . . . " ) . 
1. Whether an amendment affects substantive 
rights depends on its practical consequences. 
Whether a statute affects substantive rights or is merely 
"procedural or remedial" is more than a semantic distinction. One 
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must analyze the practical effects of the statute, not merely its 
form. A court cannot simply rely on characterizations of the 
statute. See, e.g., Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988). 
In Madsen, the Utah Supreme Court rejected a characterization 
(by the legislature itself) of a governmental immunity statute. In 
Madsen, a group of investors sued former Commissioners of the 
Department of Financial Institutions alleging "gross negligence." 
The defendants argued that a subsequent statute barring claims 
against them for "gross negligence" should be applied 
retroactively. Although the legislature itself had characterized 
the act in its title as merely "updating" and "clarifying" various 
matters, the Court did not rely on those characterizations. 
Instead, the Court considered the practical effects of the 
amendment. Because the act affected substantive rights by 
precluding what otherwise would have been viable claims, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the act could not be applied retroactively. 
Id. at 253; see Laws of Utah - 1983, Chapter 128, H.B. No. 269. 
See also Schultz v. Conger, 755 P.2d 165, 167 (Utah 1988) 
(amendment which had effect of adding a notice of claim requirement 
did not apply retroactively even though legislature had 
characterized it as merely "Clarifying application of notice 
requirements") . 
This Court should do what the Utah Supreme Court has done with 
the same issue: analyze the substance of the 1994 amendments. If 
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the practical effect is to affect substantive rights, then the 
amendment cannot be applied retroactively. 
2. An amendment imposing liability where none 
formerly existed affects substantive rights. 
A statutory amendment affects substantive rights if it 
deprives one of rights which existed prior to the amendment, and 
imposes liability where none formerly existed. Rocky Mountain 
Thrift v. Salt Lake City, 784 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989); see also 
Abeyta, 852 P.2d at 995. (an amendment is substantive where it 
enlarges, eliminates, or destroys any vested rights). 
In Brunver v. Salt Lake County. 551 P.2d 521 (Utah 1976), the 
Utah Supreme Court affirmed that an amendment which imposes a new 
liability affects substantive rights, and is not retroactive. In 
Brunyer, the plaintiff was injured when their car collided with a 
vehicle driven by a Salt Lake County Sheriff. After the accident 
the legislature passed a statute allowing, for the first time, 
joint tortfeasors to sue each other for contribution. The County 
filed suit against the friend/driver for contribution because he 
was a joint tortfeasor. The Utah Supreme Court held that the joint 
tortfeasor claim was barred. Since the joint tortfeasor 
contribution statute created a new liability for the friend/driver, 
it could not be applied retroactively. Id. at 522. 
In this case, the 1994 amendments created a new liability even 
more directly than the statute at issue in Brunyer. In this case, 
the 1994 amendments imposed new taxes on appellant GPCC. 
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3. The amendments affected substantive rights 
because they imposed new tax liabilities. 
The 1994 amendment to the Sales and Use Tax Act affected 
substantive rights by imposing new tax liabilities on previously 
untaxed transactions. The Division's suggestion that the 
legislature did not change the law to add new taxes when it largely 
rewrote the old admissions tax statute ignores settled law and the 
facts of this case. "An amendment of an unambiguous statute 
generally reflects an intent to change the law." State v. 
Standifer, 750 P.2d 258, 260 (Wash. 1988) (amendment which 
substituted term "access device" for "credit card" was a change in 
the law, not merely a clarification). 
[W]hen amendments follow closely upon a judicial decision 
interpreting a statute, and the plain meaning of the 
statutory language manifests a modification of the 
statute as previously construed, we must assume that the 
[legislature] intended to change the law. 
Nelson, Haley, et al. v. Garnev Companies, 781 P.2d 153, 155 
(Colo.App. 1989). In this case, the legislature substantially 
altered the former admissions tax provisions, adding language 
imposing taxes on "user fees" as well. The legislature did so 
right after this Court construed the old statute in 49th Street 
Galleria. To implement its decision to tax ski lift passes under 
the Sales & Use Tax Act, the legislature fundamentally changed the 
law to add a tax on "user fees" as well as "admissions." 
More telling than the legal maxims are the facts: the 1994 
amendments substantively changed the law by extending the sales tax 
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to new transactions. For example, prior to the 1994 amendments, 
the Tax Commission itself had "consistently taken the position that 
bowling [was] not subject to the sales tax on admission fees. Nor 
[were] fees for golfing, tennis, racquetball, miniature golf, or 
driving ranges [] subject to the tax." See 49th Street Galleria v. 
Tax Commission, 860 P.2d 996, 1000 n.12 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In 
contrast, the 1994 amendments expressly make every one of those 
activities subject to the new tax on "admission or user fees." 
The Tax Commission itself acknowledged that the 1994 
amendments extended the tax to new activities in its Tax Bulletin 
15-94. After listing taxable activities included in the 1994 
amendments, the Bulletin states, "[m]any of the above-listed items 
currently are subject to sales tax." The Bulletin does not claim 
that all of the newly listed items are already taxable; only that 
many of them are. In fact, the Bulletin goes on to explain: 
government entities must be prepared, beginning July 1, 
1994, to collect sales tax on all admissions and user 
fees previously not subject to tax, (emphasis added). 
Tax Bulletin 15-94, (R. 95-96) . The 1994 amendments created new 
tax liabilities where they had not previously existed. The 
amendments extended sales taxes no longer just to admissions, but 
also to "user fees previously not subject to tax" in this case, to 
ski lift and summer activity tickets. Statutes which change the 
law by adding new liabilities affect "substantive rights." Since 
the 1994 amendments affected "substantive rights," and were not 
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merely "procedural or remedial," they cannot be applied 
retroactively. 
CONCLUSION 
The Tax Commission's decision to deny appellant GPCC standing 
on the grounds that it was not the "taxpayer who paid the tax" is 
clear error. Appellant GPCC has standing to claim a refund of 
erroneously paid taxes because it is the taxpayer. Appellant GPCC 
is entitled to a refund because its lift tickets and summer 
activity tickets were not taxable since they were not "admissions." 
A ski lift ticket or summer activity ticket is an "admission" only 
if one must possess such a ticket to enter into the ski area. 
During the refund claim period, no ticket was necessary to enter 
into the Park City Ski Area. A ticket was necessary only to use 
the ski lifts or participate in one of the summer activities. 
Former section 59-12-103(1)(f) governs. The 1994 amendments are 
not retroactive but instead confirm the legislature's decision to 
impose a new tax - a "user fee." 
DATED this .•"clay of July, 1997. 
STRACHAN & STRACHAN 
Gordon Strachan 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
Utah State Tax Commission 
210 N. 1950 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
(801) 297-2200 or toil-free 1-800-662-4335 
Tax Bulletin 15-94 
Effective Date: July 1,1994 
Re: Sales Tax Treatment of Admission and User Fees 
The 1994 Utah Legislature passed Senate Bill 191, clarifying that all ad-
missions and user fees are subject to Utah sales tax. 
Effective July 1,1994, admissions and user fees charged for any amuse-
ment, entertainment, recreation, exhibition, cultural, or athletic activity shall 
be subject to Utah sales tax. 
Religious and charitable organizations are mot affected by Senate Bill 
191. Sales to or by religious and charitable organizations, including admis-
sions and user fees, are not subject to the tax. However, Senate Bill 191 
does require state and local governments to collect tax on admissions and 
user fees for government-sponsored activities. 
Taxable activities include, but are not limited to, admissions and user fees 
for theaters, movies, operas, museums, planetariums, shows of any type 
or nature, exhibitions, concerts, carnivals, amusement parks, amusement 
rides, circuses, menageries, fairs, races, contests, sporting events, dan-
ces, boxing and wrestling matches, closed-circuit television broadcasts, bil-
liard or pool parlors, bowling lanes, golf and miniature golf, golf driving 
ranges, batting cages, skating rinks, ski lifts, ski runs, ski trails, snow-
mobile trails, tennis courts, swimming pools, water slides, river runs, jeep 
tours, boat tours, scenic cruises, and horseback rides. 
Many of the above-listed items currently are subject to sales tax. Busi-
nesses and state and local public entities currently collecting sales tax for 
admissions and user fees should continue to collect tax as they have. All 
other businesses charging admissions or user fees must be prepared to 
collect sales tax on July 1,1994. Likewise, state and local government en-
tities must be prepared, beginning July 1,1994, to collect sales tax on all 
admissions and user fees previously not subject to tax. 
Exceptions 
The law states the phrase "admissions and user fees" includes season 
passes, but does not include "annua) membership dues paid to a private 
organization." A proposed Tax Commission rule, when final, is expected to 
clarify that fees beyond the annual membership dues paid to a private organization 
such as a country club for use of the golf course, pool, or any other related activity, 
are considered season passes and are therefore taxable. In addition, the rule is ex-
pected to define the phrase, "annual membership dues paid to a private organiza-
tion," to include only membership dues paid to an organization whose members, 
directly or indirectly, establish the level of the membership dues. Finally, the 
proposed rule provides that amounts paid for the following activities are not admis-
sions or user fees: 
• lessons, public or private; 
• sign-ups for participation in amateur athletics if the activity is sponsored by a 
state governmental entity, or a nonprofit corporation or organization, if the 
nonprofit corporation or organization's primary purpose, as stated in its articles 
or bylaws, is the sponsoring, promoting, and encouraging of amateur athletics; 
• sign-ups for participation in school activities. Sign-up for participation in school 
activities excludes attendance as a spectator at school activities. 
Please note, however, that fees for the above activities must be separately stated 
on an invoice in order to remain untaxed. If, for example, fees for a golf lesson are in-
cluded with fees for use of the golf course, the entire amount is subject to sales tax. 
Transition policy 
A transition policy shall be in effect for the period up to July 1,1994. Pursuant Jo 
that policy, if a contract is signed and a deposit remitted to a business entity prior to 
July 1,1994, the entire contract shall remain exempt from the sales tax, regardless of 
when the activity actually occurs. For purposes of this policy, the amount of the 
deposit shall be the amount the entity customarily requires. 
For your convenience, we have enclosed a chart indicating the sales tax rates by 
county and city. Once you have determined the correct sales tax rate for your area, 
you may request rate charts by detaching the top portion of the rate information 
sheet, with the appropriate boxes marked, and mailing it to the Tax Commission at 
the address listed on the form. 
Questions regarding this Tax Bulletin should be directed in writing to Taxpayer Ser-
vices, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, UT 84134, or by calling (800) 530-4848 or, 
toll-free 1-800-662-4335. Hearing-impaired callers may call the Operations Division's 
Telecommunication Device for the Deaf (TDD) at (801) 530-7640. 
Notice of Move 
In July 1994, the State Tax Commission will be moving to new offices. After July 1, 
please address all mail to Utah State Tax Commission, 210 North 1950 West, Salt 
Lake City, UT 84134. The Tax Commission's toll-free line, 1-800-662-4335, will 
remain the same. The Salt Lake metro area number will change to 297-2200 during 
July. Salt Lake callers please use the 530-4848 number until you receive a recording 
that the number has changed. Staff will be moving in stages during July. If you need 
to visit our offices during that month, please call in advance to determine whether 
you will be better served at the Heber Wells Building or the new location. 
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ADDENDUM B 
1 
R865-19S-4. Collection of Tax Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 59-12-107. 
A. Vendors shall not in any way waive the collection or imposition of the tax. Invoices and 
receipts shall show the tax collected as a separate item. Vendors are required to remit to the Tax 
Commission all tax funds in possession and are guarantors of all amounts required to be 
collected. 
B. If vendors collect an excess amount of tax, they must either refund such excess to their 
customers or remit it to the Tax Commission. However, vendors may first offset under 
collections of tax on sales against any excess tax collected in the same quarterly reporting period. 
Vendors may not offset underpayment of tax on purchases, whether the purchases are from in 
state or out of state sources. 
(c) 1990-1997 by Michie, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved. 
ADDENDUM C 
1 
R865-19S-12. Filing of Returns Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 59-12-107. 
A. Every person responsible for the collection of the tax under the act shall file a return with 
the Tax Commission whether or not sales tax is due. Where a vendor operates two or more 
places of business, he shall file one return, accompanied by Form TC-71A, Schedule A -
Allocation of Local Sales and Use Taxes, covering the operations of all places of business 
operated under the same account number. Each return must be signed by the taxpayer or an 
authorized agent. 
B. Returns, accompanied by the tax due, must be filed with the Tax Commission. If the due 
date falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, returns will be considered timely filed if 
received on the next business day. If returns are transmitted through the United States mail, a 
legible cancellation mark on the envelope, or the date of registration of certification thereof by a 
United States post office, is considered the date the return is filed. 
C. Extensions of time for filing of returns and paying the tax are granted only for cause and 
upon written application received prior to the time the return is due. No such extension shall be 
made for more than 90 days. 
D. Sales and use tax returns shall be filed and paid quarterly beginning with the first calendar 
quarter of business, or portion thereof, with the following exceptions: 
1. New businesses that expect annual sales and use tax liability less than $1,000, shall be 
assigned an annual filing status unless quarterly filing status is requested. 
2. Businesses currently assigned a quarterly filing status, in good standing and reporting less 
than $1,000 in tax for the preceding calendar year may be changed to annual filing status. 
The Tax Commission will notify businesses, in writing, if their filing status is changed to 
annual. 
3. Businesses assigned an annual filing status reporting in excess of $1,000 for a calendar 
year, will be changed to quarterly filing status. The Tax Commission will notify businesses, in 
writing, if their filing status is changed to quarterly. 
4. Annual returns are due on January 31 following the calendar year end. The Tax 
Commission may revoke the annual filing status if sales tax collections are in excess of $1,000 or 
as a result of delinquent payment history. 
5. Based upon delinquent sales tax amounts or upon review by the Commission, businesses 
may be required to make daily, weekly, or monthly deposits of sales tax amounts if deemed 
necessary to ensure timely remittance of the sales tax. 
E. The Tax Commission may require licensed vehicle dealers who are late or delinquent in 
reporting or remitting sales tax to pay sales tax on future vehicle sales at the time of application 
for title or registration of the vehicle. Delinquent dealers shall continue to pay at the time of 
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registration until the Tax Commission determines that all accounts are current and steps have 
been taken to ensure future compliance. The dealer must retain Tax Commission receipts for 
payment of taxes, and may adjust the quarterly tax returns to compensate for payments made at 
the time of application for title or registration. If the Tax Commission deems it necessary, it may 
require delinquent dealers to make payments with a cashier's check, a money order, or a similar 
guaranteed form of payment. 
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1 
R865-19S-33. Admissions and User Fees Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sections 59-12-102 
and 59-12-103. 
A. "Admission" means the right or privilege to enter into a place. Admission includes the 
amount paid for the right to use a reserved seat or any seat in an auditorium, theater, circus, 
stadium, schoolhouse, meeting house, or gymnasium to view any type of entertainment. 
Admission also includes the right to use a table at a night club, hotel, or roof garden whether 
such charge is designated as a cover charge, minimum charge, or any such similar charge. 
1. This applies whether the charge made for the use of the seat, table, or similar 
accommodation is combined with an admission charge to form a single charge, or is separate and 
distinct from an admission charge, or is the sole charge. 
B. "Annual membership dues paid to a private organization" includes only those dues paid 
by members who, directly or indirectly, establish the level of the dues. 
C. "Season passes" include amounts paid to participate in specific activities, once annual 
membership dues have been paid. 
D. If the original admission charge carries the right to remain in a place, or to use a seat or 
table, or other similar accommodation for a limited time only, and an additional charge is made 
for an extension of such time, the extra charge is paid for admission within the meaning of the 
law. Where a person or organization acquires the sole right to use any place or the right to 
dispose of all of the admissions to any place for one or more occasions, the amount paid is not 
subject to the tax on admissions. Such a transaction constitutes a rental of the entire place and if 
the person or organization in turn sells admissions, sales tax applies to amounts paid for such 
admissions. 
E. Annual membership dues may be paid in installments during the year. 
F. Amounts paid for the following activities are not admissions or user fees: 
1. lessons, public or private; 
2. sign up for amateur athletics if the activity is sponsored by a state governmental entity, or 
a nonprofit corporation or organization, the primary purpose of which, as stated in the 
corporation's or organization's articles or bylaws, is the sponsoring, promoting, and encouraging 
of amateur athletics; 
3. sign up for participation in school activities. Sign up for participation in school activities 
excludes attendance as a spectator at school activities. 
G. If amounts charged for activities listed in F. are billed along with admissions or user fees, 
the amounts not subject to the sales tax must be listed separately on the invoice in order to 
remain untaxed. 
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1 
R865-19S-34. Admission to Places of Amusement Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 
59-12-103. 
A. The phrase "place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation" is broad in meaning but 
conveys the basic idea of a definite location. 
B. The amount paid for admission to such a place is subject to the tax, even though such 
charge includes the right of the purchaser to participate in some activity within the place. For 
example, the sale of a ticket for a ride upon a mechanical or self-operated device is an admission 
to a place of amusement. 
C. Charges for admissions to swimming pools, skating rinks, and other places of amusement 
are subject to tax. Charges for towel rentals, swimming suit rentals, skate rentals, etc., are also 
subject to tax. Locker rental fees are subject to sales tax if the lockers are tangible personal 
property. 




As used in this chapter: 
(1) (a) "Admission or user fees" includes season passes. 
(b) "Admission or user fees" does not include annual membership dues to private 
organizations. 
(2) "Authorized carrier" means: 
(a) in the case of vehicles operated over public highways, the holder of credentials indicating 
that the vehicle is or will be operated pursuant to both the International Registration Plan (IRP) 
and the International Fuel Tax Agreement (IFTA); 
(b) in the case of aircraft, the holder of a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) operating 
certificate or air carrier's operating certificate; or 
(c) in the case of locomotives, freight cars, railroad work equipment, or other rolling stock, 
the holder of a certificate issued by the United States Interstate Commerce Commission. 
(3) (a) For purposes of Subsection 59-12-104(44), "coin-operated amusement device" means: 
(i) a coin-operated amusement, skill, or ride device; 
(ii) that is not controlled through vendor-assisted, over-the-counter, sales of tokens; and 
(iii) includes a music machine, pinball machine, billiard machine, video game machine, 
arcade machine, and a mechanical or electronic skill game or ride. 
(b) For purposes of Subsection 59-12-104(44), "coin-operated amusement device" does not 
mean a coin-operated amusement device possessing a coinage mechanism that: 
(i) accepts and registers multiple denominations of coins; and 
(ii) allows the vendor to collect the sales and use tax at the time an amusement device is 
activated and operated by a person inserting coins into the device. 
(4) "Commercial use" means the use of gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, or other fuels that 
does not constitute industrial use under Subsection (10) or residential use under Subsection (16). 
(5) "Common carrier" means a person engaged in or transacting the business of transporting 
passengers, freight, merchandise, or other property for hire within this state. 
(6) "Component part" includes: 
(a) poultry, dairy, and other livestock feed, and their components; 
(b) baling ties and twine used in the baling of hay and straw; 
(c) fuel used for providing temperature control of orchards and commercial greenhouses 
doing a majority of their business in wholesale sales, and for providing power for off-highway 
type farm machinery; and 
(d) feed, seeds, and seedlings. 
(7) "Construction materials" means any tangible personal property that will be converted into 
real property. 
(8) (a) "Fundraising sales" means sales: 
(i) (A) made by a public or private elementary or secondary school; or 
(B) made by a public or private elementary or secondary school student, grades kindergarten 
through 12; 
(ii) that are for the purpose of raising funds for the school to purchase equipment, materials, 
or provide transportation; and 
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(iii) that are part of an officially sanctioned school activity. 
(b) For purposes of Subsection (8)(a)(iii), "officially sanctioned school activity" means a 
school activity: 
(i) that is conducted in accordance with a formal policy adopted by the school or school 
district governing the authorization and supervision of fundraising activities; 
(ii) that does not directly or indirectly compensate an individual teacher or other educational 
personnel by direct payment, commissions, or payment in kind; and 
(iii) the net or gross revenues from which are deposited in a dedicated account controlled by 
the school or school district. 
(9) (a) "Home medical equipment and supplies" means equipment and supplies that: 
(i) a licensed physician prescribes or authorizes in writing as necessary for the treatment of a 
medical illness or injury or as necessary to mitigate an impairment resulting from illness or 
injury; 
(ii) are used exclusively by the person for whom they are prescribed to serve a medical 
purpose; and 
(iii) are listed as eligible for payment under Title 18 of the federal Social Security Act or 
under the state plan for medical assistance under Title 19 of the federal Social Security Act. 
(b) "Home medical equipment and supplies" does not include: 
(i) equipment and supplies purchased by, for, or on behalf of any health care facility, as 
defined in Subsection (9)(c), doctor, nurse, or other health care provider for use in their 
professional practice; 
(ii) eyeglasses, contact lenses, or equipment to correct impaired vision; or 
(iii) hearing aids or hearing aid accessories. 
(c) For purposes of Subsection (9)(b)(i), "health care facility" includes: 
(i) a clinic; 
(ii) a doctor's office; and 
(iii) a health care facility as defined in Subsection 26-21-2(1 l)(a). 
(10) "Industrial use" means the use of natural gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, or other 
fuels in: 
(a) mining or extraction of minerals; 
(b) agricultural operations to produce an agricultural product up to the time of harvest or 
placing the agricultural product into a storage facility, including: 
(i) commercial greenhouses; 
(ii) irrigation pumps; 
(iii) farm machinery; 
(iv) implements of husbandry as defined in Subsection 41- la-102(23) that are not registered 
under Title 41, Chapter la, Part 2, Registration; and 
(v) other farming activities; and 
(c) manufacturing tangible personal property at an establishment described in SIC Codes 
2000 to 3999 of the 1987 Standard Industrial Classification Manual of the federal Executive 
Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget. 
(11) "Manufactured home" means any manufactured home or mobile home as defined in Title 
58, Chapter 56, Utah Uniform Building Standards Act. 
(12) (a) "Medicine" means: 
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(i) insulin, syringes, and any medicine prescribed for the treatment of human ailments by a 
person authorized to prescribe treatments and dispensed on prescription filled by a registered 
pharmacist, or supplied to patients by a physician, surgeon, or podiatric physician; 
(ii) any medicine dispensed to patients in a county or other licensed hospital if prescribed for 
that patient and dispensed by a registered pharmacist or administered under the direction of a 
physician; and 
(iii) any oxygen or stoma supplies prescribed by a physician or administered under the 
direction of a physician or paramedic. 
(b) "Medicine" does not include: 
(i) any auditory, prosthetic, ophthalmic, or ocular device or appliance; or 
(ii) any alcoholic beverage. 
(13) (a) "Other fuels" means products that burn independently to produce heat or energy. 
(b) "Other fuels" includes oxygen when it is used in the manufacturing of tangible personal 
property. 
(14) "Person" includes any individual, firm, partnership, joint venture, association, 
corporation, estate, trust, business trust, receiver, syndicate, this state, any county, city, 
municipality, district, or other local governmental entity of the state, or any group or combination 
acting as a unit. 
(15) "Purchase price" means the amount paid or charged for tangible personal property or any 
other taxable item or service under Subsection 59-12-103(1), excluding only cash discounts taken 
or any excise tax imposed on the purchase price by the federal government. 
(16) "Residential use" means the use in or around a home, apartment building, sleeping 
quarters, and similar facilities or accommodations. 
(17) (a) "Retail sale" means any sale within the state of tangible personal property or any 
other taxable item or service under Subsection 59-12-103(1), other than resale of such property, 
item, or service by a retailer or wholesaler to a user or consumer. 
(b) "Retail sale" includes sales by any farmer or other agricultural producer of poultry, eggs, 
or dairy products to consumers if the sales have an average monthly sales value of $125 or more. 
(c) "Retail sale" does not include, and no additional sales or use tax shall be assessed against, 
those transactions where a purchaser of tangible personal property pays applicable sales or use 
taxes on its initial nonexempt purchases of property and then enters into a sale-leaseback 
transaction by which title to such property is transferred by the purchaser-lessee to a lessor for 
consideration, provided: 
(i) the transaction is intended as a form of financing for the property to the purchaser-lessee; 
and 
(ii) pursuant to generally accepted accounting principles, the purchaser-lessee is required to 
capitalize the subject property for financial reporting purposes, and account for the lease 
payments as payments made under a financing arrangement. 
(18) (a) "Retailer" means any person engaged in a regularly organized retail business in 
tangible personal property or any other taxable item or service under Subsection 59-12-103(1), 
and who is selling to the user or consumer and not for resale. 
(b) "Retailer" includes commission merchants, auctioneers, and any person regularly engaged 
in the business of selling to users or consumers within the state. 
(c) "Retailer" includes any person who engages in regular or systematic solicitation of a 
(c) 1953-1997 by Michie, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved. 
4 
consumer market in this state by the distribution of catalogs, periodicals, advertising flyers, or 
other advertising, or by means of print, radio or television media, by mail, telegraphy, telephone, 
computer data base, cable, optic, microwave, or other communication system. 
(d) "Retailer" does not include farmers, gardeners, stockmen, poultrymen, or other growers or 
agricultural producers producing and doing business on their own premises, except those who are 
regularly engaged in the business of buying or selling for a profit. 
(e) For purposes of this chapter the commission may regard as retailers the following if they 
determine it is necessary for the efficient administration of this chapter: salesmen, 
representatives, peddlers, or canvassers as the agents of the dealers, distributors, supervisors, or 
employers under whom they operate or from whom they obtain the tangible personal property 
sold by them, irrespective of whether they are making sales on their own behalf or on behalf of 
these dealers, distributors, supervisors, or employers, except that: 
(i) a printer's facility with which a retailer has contracted for printing shall not be considered 
to be a salesman, representative, peddler, canvasser, or agent of the retailer; and 
(ii) the ownership of property that is located at the premises of a printer's facility with which 
the retailer has contracted for printing and that consists of the final printed product, property that 
becomes a part of the final printed product, or copy from which the printed product is produced, 
shall not result in the retailer being deemed to have or maintain an office, distribution house, 
sales house, warehouse, service enterprise, or other place of business, or to maintain a stock of 
goods, within this state. 
(19) "Sale" means any transfer of title, exchange, or barter, conditional or otherwise, in any 
manner, of tangible personal property or any other taxable item or service under Subsection 
59-12-103(1), for a consideration. It includes: 
(a) installment and credit sales; 
(b) any closed transaction constituting a sale; 
(c) any sale of electrical energy, gas, services, or entertainment taxable under this chapter; 
(d) any transaction if the possession of property is transferred but the seller retains the title as 
security for the payment of the price; and 
(e) any transaction under which right to possession, operation, or use of any article of tangible 
personal property is granted under a lease or contract and the transfer of possession would be 
taxable if an outright sale were made. 
(20) (a) "Sales relating to schools" means sales by a public school district or public or private 
elementary or secondary school, grades kindergarten through 12, that are directly related to the 
school's or school district's educational functions or activities and include: 
(i) the sale of textbooks, textbook fees, laboratory fees, laboratory supplies, and safety 
equipment; 
(ii) the sale of clothing that: 
(A) a student is specifically required to wear as a condition of participation in a 
school-related event or activity; and 
(B) is not readily adaptable to general or continued usage to the extent that it takes the place 
of ordinary clothing; 
(iii) sales of food if the net or gross revenues generated by the food sales are deposited into a 
school district fund or school fund dedicated to school meals; and 
(iv) transportation charges for official school activities. 
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(b) "Sales relating to schools" does not include: 
(i) gate receipts; 
(ii) special event admission fees; 
(iii) bookstore sales of items that are not educational materials or supplies; and 
(iv) except as provided in Subsection (20)(a)(ii), clothing. 
(21) "State" means the state of Utah, its departments, and agencies. 
(22) "Storage" means any keeping or retention of tangible personal property or any other 
taxable item or service under Subsection 59-12-103(1), in this state for any purpose except sale 
in the regular course of business. 
(23) (a) "Tangible personal property" means: 
(i) all goods, wares, merchandise, produce, and commodities; 
(ii) all tangible or corporeal things and substances which are dealt in or capable of being 
possessed or exchanged; 
(iii) water in bottles, tanks, or other containers; and 
(iv) all other physically existing articles or things, including property severed from real estate. 
(b) "Tangible personal property" does not include: 
(i) real estate or any interest or improvements in real estate; 
(ii) bank accounts, stocks, bonds, mortgages, notes, and other evidence of debt; 
(iii) insurance certificates or policies; 
(iv) personal or governmental licenses; 
(v) water in pipes, conduits, ditches, or reservoirs; 
(vi) currency and coinage constituting legal tender of the United States or of a foreign nation; 
and 
(vii) all gold, silver, or platinum ingots, bars, medallions, or decorative coins, not constituting 
legal tender of any nation, with a gold, silver, or platinum content of not less than 80%. 
(24) (a) "Use" means the exercise of any right or power over tangible personal property under 
Subsection 59-12-103(1), incident to the ownership or the leasing of that property, item, or 
service. 
(b) "Use" does not include the sale, display, demonstration, or trial of that property in the 
regular course of business and held for resale. 
(25) "Vehicle" means any aircraft, as defined in Section 2-1-1; any vehicle, as defined in 
Section 41-la-102; any off-highway vehicle, as defined in Section 41-22-2; and any vessel, as 
defined in Section 41-la-102; that is required to be titled, registered, or both. "Vehicle" for 
purposes of Subsection 59-12-104(37) only, also includes any locomotive, freight car, railroad 
work equipment, or other railroad rolling stock. 
(26) "Vehicle dealer" means a person engaged in the business of buying, selling, or 
exchanging vehicles as defined in Subsection (25). 
(27) (a) "Vendor" means: 
(i) any person receiving any payment or consideration upon a sale of tangible personal 
property or any other taxable item or service under Subsection 59-12-103(1), or to whom such 
payment or consideration is payable; and 
(ii) any person who engages in regular or systematic solicitation of a consumer market in this 
state by the distribution of catalogs, periodicals, advertising flyers, or other advertising, or by 
means of print, radio or television media, by mail, telegraphy, telephone, computer data base, 
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cable, optic, microwave, or other communication system. 
(b) "Vendor" does not mean a printer's facility described in Subsection (18)(e). 
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mail, telegraphy, telephone, computer data base, 
cable, optic, microwave, or other communication 
system. 
(d) "Retailer" does not include farmers, gardeners, 
stockmen, poultrymen, or other growers or agricul-
tural producers producing and doing business on 
their own premises, except those who are regularly 
engaged in the business of buying or selling for a 
profit. 
(e) For purposes of this chapter the commission 
may regard as retailers the following if they deter-
mine it is necessary for the efficient administration 
of this chapter: salesmen, representatives, 
peddlers, or canvassers as the agents of the dealers, 
distributors, supervisors, or employers under whom 
they operate or from whom they obtain the tangible 
personal property sold by them, irrespective of 
whether they are making sales on their own behalf 
or on behalf of these dealers, distributors, supervi-
sors, or employers. 
(10) "Sale" means any transfer of title, exchange, 
or barter, conditional or otherwise, in any manner, 
of tangible personal property or any other taxable 
item or service under Subsection 59-12-103 (1), for 
a consideration. It includes: 
(a) installment and credit sales; 
(b) any closed transaction constituting a sale; 
(c) any sale of electrical energy, gas, services, or 
entertainment taxable under this chapter, 
(d) any transaction if the possession of property is 
transferred but the seller retains the title as securi-
ty for the payment of the price; and 
(e) any transaction under which right to posses-
sion, operation, or use of any article of tangible per-
sonal property is granted under a lease or contract 
and the transfer of possession would be taxable if an 
outright sale were made. 
(11) "State" means the state of Utah, its depart-
ments, and agencies. 
(12) "Storage" means any keeping or retention of 
tangible personal property or any other taxable 
item or service under Subsection 59-12-103 (1), in 
this state for any purpose except sale in the regular 
course of business. 
(13) (a) "Tangible personal property" means: 
(i) all goods, wares, merchandise, produce, and 
commodities; 
(ii) all tangible or corporeal things and substances 
which are dealt in or capable of being possessed or 
exchanged; 
(iii) water in bottles, tanks, or other containers; 
and 
(iv) all other physically existing articles or things, 
including property severed from real estate. 
(b) "Tangible personal property" does not include: 
(i) real estate or any interest or improvements in 
real estate; 
(ii) bank accounts, stocks, bonds, mortgages, 
notes, and other evidence of debt; 
(iii) insurance certificates or policies; 
(iv) personal or governmental licenses; 
(v) water in pipes, conduits, ditches, or reservoirs; 
(vi) currency and coinage constituting legal ten-
der of the United States or of a foreign nation; and 
(vii) all gold, silver, or platinum ingots, bars, me-
dallions, or decorative coins, not constituting legal 
tender of any nation, with a gold, silver, or platinum 
content of not less than 80%. 
(14) (a) "Use" means the exercise of any right or 
power over tangible personal property under Sub-
section 59-12-103 (1), incident to the ownership or 
the leasing of that property, item, or service. 
(b) "Use" does not include the sale, display, dem-
onstration, or trial of that property in the regular 
course of business and held for resale. 
(15) "Vehicle" means any aircraft, as defined in 
Section 2-1-1 ; any vehicle, as defined in Section 
41-la-102; any off-highway vehicle, as defined in 
Section 41-22-2; and any vessel, as defined in Sec-
tion 41-la-102; that is required to be titled, regis-
tered, or both. 
(16) "Vehicle dealer" means a person engaged in 
the business of buying, selling, or exchanging ve-
hicles as defined in Subsection (15). 
(17) "Vendor" means: 
(a) any person receiving any payment or consider-
ation upon a sale of tangible personal property or 
any other taxable item or service under Subsection 
59-12-103 (1), or to whom such payment or consid-
eration is payable; and 
(b) any person who engages in regular or system-
atic solicitation of a consumer market in this state 
by the distribution of catalogs, periodicals, advertis-
ing flyers, or other advertising, or by means of print, 
radio or television media, by mail, telegraphy, tele-
phone, computer data base, cable, optic, microwave, 
or other communication system. 
Section 2. Section Amended. 
Section 59-12-103, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as last amended by Chapter 241, Laws of Utah 1992, 
is amended to read: 
59-12-103. Sales and use tax base — Rate. 
(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the 
amount paid or charged for the following: 
(a) retail sales of tangible personal property made 
within the state; 
(b) amount paid to common carriers or to tele-
phone or telegraph corporations, whether the corpo-
rations are municipally or privately owned, for: 
(i) all transportation; 
(ii) intrastate telephone service; or 
(iii) tel< 
(c)gas,< 
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(c) gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, or other fuels 
sold or furnished for commercial consumption; 
(d) gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, or other 
fuels sold or furnished for residential use; 
(e) meals sold; 
commodations] user fees for theaters, movies, oper-
as, museums, planetariums, shows of any type or 
nature, exhibitions, concerts, carnivals, amuse-
ment parks, amusement rides, circuses, menager-
ies, fairs, races, contests, sporting events, dances, 
boxing and wrestling matches, closed circuit televi-
sion broadcasts, billiard or pool parlors, bowling 
lanes, golf and miniature golf, golf driving ranges, ; 
batting cages, skating rinks, ski lifts, ski runs, ski 
trails, snowmobile trails, tennis courts, swimming 
pools, water slides, river runs, jeep tours, boat 
tours, scenic cruises, horseback rides, sports activi-
ties, or any other amusement, entertainment, rec-
reation, exhibition, cultural, or athletic activity; 
(ii) the tax imposed on admission or user fees in 
Subsection (i) does not affect an entity's sales tax ex-
empt status under Section 59-12-104.1; 
(g) services for repairs or renovations of tangible 
personal property or services to install tangible per-
sonal property in connection with other tangible 
personal property; 
Title 9, Chapter i, Part 3, Utah Sports Authority 
Act: 
(i) the amount of sales and use tax generated by a 
1/64% tax rate on the taxable items and services un-
der Subsection (1); 
(ii) the amount of revenue generated by a 1/64% 
tax rate under Section 59-12-204 on the taxable 
items and services under Subsection (1); and 
(iii) interest earned on the amounts under Subsec-
tions (i) and (ii). 
(b) These funds shall be used by the Utah Sports 
Authority as follows: 
(i) to the extent funds are available, to transfer di-
rectly to a debt service fund or to otherwise reim-
burse to the state of Utah any amount expended on 
debt service or any other cost of any bonds issued by 
the state to construct any public sports facility as 
defined in Section 9-1-303; and 
(ii) to pay for the actual and necessary operating, 
administrative, legal, and other expenses of the 
Utah Sports Authority, but not including protocol 
expenses for seeking and obtaining the right to host 
the Winter Olympic Games. 
Section 3. Effective Date. 
This act takes effect on July 1,1994. 
(h) cleaning or washing of tangible personal prop-
erty; 
(i) tourist home, hotel, motel, or trailer court ac-
commodations and services for less than 30 consecu-
tive days; 
(j) laundry and dry cleaning services; 
(k) leases and rentals of tangible personal proper-
ty if the property situs is in this state, if the lessee 
took possession in this state, or if the property is 
stored, used, or otherwise consumed in this state; 
and 
(1) tangible personal property stored, used, or con-
sumed in this state. 
(2) Except for Subsection (lXd), the rates of the 
tax levied under Subsection (1) shall be: 
(a) 5-3/32% through December 31,1989; and 
(b) 5% from and after January 1,1990. 
(3) The rates of the tax levied under Subsection 
(lXd) shall be: 
(a) 2-3/32% through December 31,1989; and 
(b) 2% from and after January 1,1990. 
(4) (a) From January 1,1990, through December 
31, 1999, there shall be deposited in an Olympics 
special revenue fund or funds as determined by the 
Division of Finance under Section 51-5-4, for the 




59-12-103. Sales and use tax base - Rate. 
(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount paid or charged for the following: 
(a) retail sales of tangible personal property made within the state; 
(b) amount paid to common carriers or to telephone or telegraph corporations, whether the 
corporations are municipally or privately owned, for: 
(i) all transportation; 
(ii) intrastate telephone service; or 
(iii) telegraph service; 
(c) gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, or other fuels sold for commercial use; 
(d) gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, or other fuels sold for residential use; 
(e) meals sold; 
(f) (i) admission or user fees for theaters, movies, operas, museums, planetariums, shows of 
any type or nature, exhibitions, concerts, carnivals, amusement parks, amusement rides, circuses, 
menageries, fairs, races, contests, sporting events, dances, boxing and wrestling matches, closed 
circuit television broadcasts, billiard or pool parlors, bowling lanes, golf and miniature golf, golf 
driving ranges, batting cages, skating rinks, ski lifts, ski runs, ski trails, snowmobile trails, tennis 
courts, swimming pools, water slides, river runs, jeep tours, boat tours, scenic cruises, horseback 
rides, sports activities, or any other amusement, entertainment, recreation, exhibition, cultural, or 
athletic activity; 
(ii) the tax imposed on admission or user fees in Subsection (l)(f)(i) does not affect an 
entity's sales tax exempt status under Section 59-12-104.1; 
(g) services for repairs or renovations of tangible personal property or services to install 
tangible personal property in connection with other tangible personal property; 
(h) except as provided in Subsection 59-12-104(8), cleaning or washing of tangible personal 
property; 
(i) tourist home, hotel, motel, or trailer court accommodations and services for less than 30 
consecutive days; 
(j) laundry and dry cleaning services; 
(k) leases and rentals of tangible personal property if the property situs is in this state, if the 
lessee took possession in this state, or if the property is stored, used, or otherwise consumed in 
this state; and 
(1) tangible personal property stored, used, or consumed in this state. 
(2) Except for Subsection (l)(d), the rates of the tax levied under Subsection (1) shall be: 
(a) 5% through June 30, 1994; and 
(b) 4.875% from and after July 1, 1994. 
(3) The rates of the tax levied under Subsection (l)(d) shall be 2% from and after January 1, 
1990. 
(4) (a) From January 1, 1990, through December 31, 1999, there shall be deposited in an 
Olympics special revenue fund or funds as determined by the Division of Finance under Section 
51-5-4, for the use of the Utah Sports Authority created under Title 63 A, Chapter 7, Utah Sports 
Authority Act: 
(i) the amount of sales and use tax generated by a 1/64% tax rate on the taxable items and 
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services under Subsection (1); 
(ii) the amount of revenue generated by a 1/64% tax rate under Section 59-12-204 on the 
taxable items and services under Subsection (1); and 
(iii) interest earned on the amounts under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii). 
(b) These funds shall be used: 
(i) by the Utah Sports Authority as follows: 
(A) to the extent funds are available, to transfer directly to a debt service fund or to otherwise 
reimburse to the state any amount expended on debt service or any other cost of any bonds issued 
by the state to construct any public sports facility as defined in Section 63A-7-103; 
(B) to pay for the actual and necessary operating, administrative, legal, and other expenses of 
the Utah Sports Authority, but not including protocol expenses for seeking and obtaining the 
right to host the Winter Olympic Games; and 
(C) the Utah Sports Authority may not expend, loan, or pledge in the aggregate more than 
$59,000,000 of sales and use tax deposited into the Olympics special revenue fund under 
Subsection (4)(a) unless the Legislature appropriates additional funds from the Olympics special 
revenue fund to the Utah Sports Authority; or 
(ii) to pay salary, benefits, or administrative costs associated with the State Olympic 
Coordinator under Subsection 63A-10-103(3), except that the salary, benefits, or administrative 
costs may not be paid from the sales and tax revenues generated by municipalities or counties 
and deposited under Subsection (4)(a)(ii). 
(c) A payment of salary, benefits, or administrative costs under Subsection 63A-10-103(3) is 
not considered an expenditure of the Utah Sports Authority. 
(d) If the Legislature appropriates additional funds under Subsection (4)(b)(i)(C), the 
authority may not expend, loan, pledge, or enter into any agreement to expend, loan, or pledge 
the appropriated funds unless the authority: 
(i) contracts in writing for the full reimbursement of the monies to the Olympics special 
revenue fund by a public sports entity or other person benefitting from the expenditure; and 
(ii) obtains a security interest that secures payment or performance of the obligation to 
reimburse. 
(e) A contract or agreement entered into in violation of Subsection (4)(d) is void. 
(f) Any monies in the Olympics special revenue fund or funds as of October 1, 2002, shall be 
dispersed as follows: 
(i) 50% shall be deposited into the General Fund; and 
(ii) 50% to counties, cities, or towns in proportion to the sales and use taxes generated by the 
county, city, or town and deposited under Subsection (4)(a)(ii). 
(5) (a) From July 1, 1997, the annual amount of sales and use tax generated by a 1/8% tax 
rate on the taxable items and services under Subsection (1) shall be used as follows: 
(i) 50% shall be used for water and wastewater projects as provided in Subsections (b) 
through (f); and 
(ii) 50% shall be used for transportation projects as provided in Subsections (g) through (h). 
(b) Five hundred thousand dollars each year shall be transferred to the Agriculture Resource 
Development Fund created in Section 4-18-6. 
(c) Fifty percent of the remaining amount generated by 50%) of the 1/8% tax rate shall be 
transferred to the Water Resources Conservation and Development Fund created in Section 
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73-10-24 for use by the Division of Water Resources. In addition to the uses allowed of the fund 
under Section 73-10-24, the fund may also be used to: 
(i) provide a portion of the local cost share, not to exceed in any fiscal year 50% of the funds 
made available to the Division of Water Resources under this section, of potential project 
features of the Central Utah Project; 
(ii) conduct hydrologic and geotechnical investigations by the Department of Natural 
Resources in a cooperative effort with other state, federal, or local entities, for the purpose of 
quantifying surface and ground water resources and describing the hydrologic systems of an area 
in sufficient detail so as to enable local and state resource managers to plan for and accommodate 
growth in water use without jeopardizing the resource; 
(iii) fund state required dam safety improvements; and 
(iv) protect the state's interest in interstate water compact allocations, including the hiring of 
technical and legal staff. 
(d) Twenty-five percent of the remaining amount generated by 50% of the 1/8% tax rate shall 
be transferred to the Utah Wastewater Loan Program subaccount created in Section 73-10c-5 for 
use by the Water Quality Board to fund wastewater projects as defined in Section 73-10b-2. 
(e) Twenty-five percent of the remaining amount generated by 50% of the 1/8% tax rate shall 
be transferred to the Drinking Water Loan Program subaccount created in Section 73-10c-5 for 
use by the Division of Drinking Water to: 
(i) provide for the installation and repair of collection, treatment, storage, and distribution 
facilities for any public water system, as defined in Section 19-4-102; 
(ii) develop underground sources of water, including springs and wells; and 
(iii) develop surface water sources. 
(f) Notwithstanding Subsections (5)(b), (c), (d), and (e), $100,000 of the remaining amount 
generated by 50% of the 1/8% tax rate each year shall be transferred as dedicated credits to the 
Division of Water Rights to cover the costs incurred in hiring legal and other technical staff for 
the adjudication of water rights. Any remaining balance at the end of each fiscal year shall lapse 
back to the contributing funds on a prorated basis. 
(g) Fifty percent of the 1/8% tax rate shall be transferred to the Class B and Class C Roads 
Account to be expended as provided in Title 27, Chapter 12, Article 11, except as provided in 
Subsection (h). 
(h) (i) If HB 53, "Transportation Corridor Preservation," passes in the 1996 General Session, 
$500,000 each year shall be transferred to the Transportation Corridor Preservation Revolving 
Loan Fund, and if HB 121, "State Park Access Roads," passes in the 1996 General Session, from 
July 1, 1997, through June 30, 2006, $500,000 shall be transferred to the Department of 
Transportation for the State Park Access Highways Improvement Program. The remaining 
amount generated by 50% of the 1/8% tax rate shall be transferred to the Class B and Class C 
Roads Account. 
(ii) At least 50% of the money transferred to the Transportation Corridor Preservation 
Revolving Loan Fund under Subsection (5)(h)(i) shall be used to fund loan applications made by 
the Department of Transportation at the request of local governments. 
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Sec. 22. [Reading of bills - Bill to contain only one subject - Bills passed by majority.] 
Every bill shall be read by title three separate times in each house except in cases where 
two-thirds of the house where such bill is pending suspend this requirement. Except general 
appropriation bills and bills for the codification and general revision of laws, no bill shall be 
passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title. The vote 
upon the final passage of all bills shall be by yeas and nays and entered upon the respective 
journals of the house in which the vote occurs. No bill or joint resolution shall be passed except 
with the assent of the majority of all the members elected to each house of the Legislature. 
History: Const. 1896; Nov. 6,1900; L. 1969, S.J.R. 5; 1972, S.J.R. 1. 
Cross-References. - Enacting clause, § 36-10-1. 
Enrolling bills, §36-3-1. 
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ADDENDUM J 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
GREATER PARK CITY COMPANY, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
OPERATIONS DIVISION OF THE 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent, 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND FINAL DECISION 
Appeal Nos. 94-1567 
95-1163 
Tax Type: Sales and Use Tax 
Refund Period: May 1992 
through June 1994 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
These matters came before the Utah State Tax Commission 
for a Formal Hearing on July 29, 1996. Case No. 94-1567 had also 
been heard at a Motion For Summary Judgment on June 12, 1996. G. 
Blaine Davis, Administrative Law Judge, heard the matters for and 
on behalf of the Commission. Alice Shearer, Commissioner, also 
participated in a portion of the hearings. Present and 
representing Petitioner were Mr. Gordon Strachan and Mr. Todd 
Wakefield, from the law firm of Strachan and Strachan, together 
with Mr. Josh Wells, a law clerk, with that law firm, and Mr. Phil 
Jones and Andrew Fish from the Petitioner, Present and 
representing Respondent were Mr. Clark Snelson, Assistant Attorney 
Appeal No. 94-1567 and 95-1163 
General, together with Ms. Julie Halvorson from the Customer 
Service Division, and Mr. Craig Sandberg, Mr. Bob Fenton, Mr. Larry 
Wurston, and Ms. Joy Natale from the Auditing Division. 
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the 
hearings, the Tax Commission hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The tax in question is sales and use tax. 
2. The periods in question are, for case no. 94-1567, 
June, 1991 through June, 1994, and for case no. 95-1163, May, 1992 
through June, 1994. 
3. Petitioner filed claims for refund for sales and use 
taxes paid for its summer and winter activities conducted in Park 
City, Utah. The claim for refund for the summer activities is 
contained in appeal no. 9,4-1567, and its claim for refund for its 
winter activities is contained in appeal no. 95-1163. 
4. Petitioner operates the Park City ski area in Park 
City, Utah. The Park City ski area consists of approximately 4,000 
acres of unfenced land. 
5. During the winter months, Petitioner sells ski lift 
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tickets to customers desiring to use the Park City ski lifts and 
gondola. Skiers are not permitted to use the ski lifts or gondola 
without a lift ticket, but may go upon the premises and use the ski 
runs if they do not ride upon the lift or gondola. 
6. During the summer months, Petitioner sells tickets to 
use its gondola, Alpine Slide, Miner's Park Amusement Rides, and 
miniature golf course. Individuals are not permitted to play 
miniature golf or ride any of the rides without a ticket, but they 
may hike or participate in other recreational activities within the 
ski area without the payment of a fee. 
7. The tickets which are sold by Petitioner do not have 
printed upon them the amount of sales tax, which is included in the 
price charged for the ticket. 
8. Petitioner fras regularly filed sales tax returns and 
paid the amount of tax shown due thereon. On those sales tax 
returns, Petitioner has claimed and retained 1.5% of the tax amount 
as the vendor discount as permitted by Utah Code Annotated §59-12-
108(3). That statute permits vendors, who meet certain 
requirements, to "retain an amount not to exceed 1.5% of the total 
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monthly sales tax collected. . . ." 
9. Petitioner has also claimed its share of the 
investment incentive to ski resorts provided by §59-12-120, which 
based the investment incentive upon the proportional amount of 
"sales tax collected from the sale of ski lift tickets." 
10. When Petitioner filed its sales tax returns, it 
calculated the net amount of sales by dividing its gross receipts 
by 1.0725, which was to discount the gross amount by 6.25% for the 
sales and use tax, and one (1.00%) percent for the resort area tax. 
Petitioner then calculated the tax on the net amount after 
deduction of the 6.25% for sales tax and the one (1.00%) percent 
for resort area tax. 
11. Petitioner has claimed a refund for sales and use 
tax paid in an amount of $3,054,895.36 for the winter activities, 
plus $185,624.79 for the summer activities, together with interest 
thereon. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
For the periods in question, §59-12-103 (f) provided for 
a sales and use tax on: 
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"Admission to any place of amusement, entertain-
ment, or recreation, including seats and tables 
reserved or otherwise, and other similar 
accommodations;" 
For the period in question, Rule R865-19-34S, Utah 
Administrative Code, sub-paragraphs (A) and (B) of the Rule 
provided as follows: 
"A. The phrase "place of amusement, entertain-
ment, or recreation" is broad in meaning but con-
veys the basic idea of a definite location. 
B. The amount paid for admission to such a 
place is subject to the tax, even though such 
charge includes the right of the purchaser to 
participate in some activity within the place. 
For example, the sale of a ticket for a ride 
upon a mechanical or self-operated device is an 
admission to a place of amusement." 
A vendor who collects sales tax and who meets certain 
other criteria is entitled to retain, as a vendor discount, an 
amount of 1.5% of the total monthly sales tax collected, which 
vendor discount is to reimburse the vendor for collecting and 
remitting the sales and use taxes to the Commission on a monthly 
basis. (§59-12-108(3)(a), Utah Code Annotated, as amended). 
A ski resort was entitled to claim certain investment 
incentives based upon the total sales tax collected. (§59-12-120, 
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Utah Code Annotated, as amended). 
If a vendor collects an amount of tax in excess of the 
lawful state and local percentage of total taxable sales, the 
vendor is required to remit such excess amount to the Utah State 
Tax Commission and is not permitted to retain any such tax which it 
has collected but which was not lawfully due. (Utah Code Annotated 
§59-12-107(2) (e), now renumbered as §59-12-107(2) (f); Rule R865-19-
4S; Rule R865-10-16S). 
ANALYSIS 
The parties have spent considerable time and effort 
addressing the issue of whether or not the charges which were 
imposed by Petitioner were taxable under Utah Law as an 
"admission." The Commission has given careful consideration to the 
arguments presented by e^ch of the parties in support of their 
respective positions regarding that issue. Although the Commission 
does not see any reason that the sale of most of the tickets of 
Petitioner would not constitute "the sale of a ticket for a ride 
upon a mechanical or self-operated device", which has been defined 
as an admission by the rules of the Utah Administrative Code, the 
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Commission has decided that it is not necessary to decide that 
issue in order to reach a final determination in these cases. 
In the opinion of the Commission, the claims for refund 
filed by Petitioner can only be granted if Petitioner was the 
taxpayer that paid the tax in these matters. Petitioner has argued 
that it is the taxpayer, and that because an amount of tax was not 
printed upon the tickets which were sold, it demonstrates that 
Petitioner was the taxpayer. 
Petitioner was the taxpayer who filed the sales and use 
tax returns, and Petitioner did not show an amount of tax on the 
tickets, but instead just charged a gross price and then netted the 
amount of sale from the tax for reporting purposes. However, the 
Commission rejects the position of Petitioner that it was the 
taxpayer that paid the taxes. Instead, the Commission specifically 
finds that Petitioner was not the taxpayer who paid the tax, and 
that the tax was paid by the persons purchasing the tickets. 
In these cases, the actions of Petitioner do not support 
its claims that it was the taxpayer. Likewise, the evidence 
presented in this case does not support the legal theory presented 
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by Petitioner that it was the taxpayer who paid the tax, and that 
no tax was collected from the individuals who paid for the ski 
tickets and ride tickets and other activities. 
The first matter of evidence which does not support the 
legal theory of Petitioner is the way in which it calculated the 
amount of sales and use tax which was due. By taking the gross 
amount of receipts and dividing by 1.0725 to reduce for the sales 
and use tax and the resort area tax, Petitioner has reported to the 
State of Utah that sales were made in a net amount, and that sales 
and use taxes of 6.25% and 1.00% of the net amount of sales were 
collected. If Petitioner's theory were to be accepted that it was 
the payor of the sales tax, then it would have been required to pay 
sales and use tax on the gross amount of the sales prior to the 
reduction, and it would have been required to pay more sales and 
use tax than has been paid. Instead, the methods used by 
Petitioner are a very common method, and a method which has been 
accepted by the Commission in prior cases, for calculating the 
amount of sales tax collected from the customers. However, it 
clearly does not mean that the vendor is the party paying the tax. 
-8-
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The next item of evidence which does not support the 
legal theory of Petitioner is its acceptance of the 1.5% vendor 
discount allowed by §59-12-108, supra, to reimburse the vendor for 
the costs of collecting and remitting the sales and use taxes to 
the Commission on a monthly basis. Petitioner has availed itself 
of that 1.5% vendor discount. Petitioner has claimed that 1.5% 
vendor discount on each of the sales tax returns which it has 
filed. Petitioner, therefore, reported to the Tax Commission that 
it had collected sales and use tax, or it would not have been 
entitled to a credit for the 1.5% vendor discount. At the time 
Petitioner filed its regular monthly or quarterly sales tax 
returns, it clearly believed that the sales tax had been collected 
from other persons, or it would not have been eligible for the 
discount and would not haye claimed the vendor discount. 
The third item of evidence which does not support the 
legal theory of Petitioner is Petitioner's request to receive the 
investment incentive allowed to ski resorts, which was calculated 
based upon the total sales tax collected from the sale of ski lift 
tickets in Utah. Again, Petitioner reported that it collected 
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sales tax from the sale of ski lift tickets in Utah. To now claim 
that the payment of the sales tax was made by Petitioner and was 
not collected from the parties paying for the tickets is clearly 
contrary to the claims which it previously made in its claim for 
the investment incentive available to ski resorts. 
In summary, all prior actions, including all sales tax 
reports filed with the Tax Commission, all claims for vendor 
discounts included on those sales tax returns, and all claims for 
investment incentive to ski resorts made by Petitioner were made 
based upon sales and use tax having been collected from the persons 
who paid for the lift and ride tickets at the facilities of 
Petitioner. For Petitioner to now claim the sales tax was paid by 
Petitioner simply lacks credibility and the Commission finds the 
claim to be without merit,. The claim appears to have been made, 
not because Petitioner really believes that it paid the sales tax, 
but because Petitioner believes that by making such a claim, it may 
be able to obtain a very large refund of taxes. 
It is very obvious that Petitioner calculated the price 
of its ski tickets and other tickets to include the amount of the 
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sales tax. At the time the funds were collected, Petitioner 
believed that it was collecting sales and use tax, and it was 
reported to the Commission as though such sales and use taxes were 
collected from the customers of Petitioner. If Petitioner really 
believed otherwise at the time such sales tax returns were filed, 
it would have filed the returns in a different manner, it would 
have paid sales tax on the gross amount of receipts instead of the 
net amount of receipts, it would not have claimed the 1.5% vendor 
discount, and it would not have claimed the investment incentive 
for ski resorts. 
Accordingly, the Commission hereby finds that the sales 
tax was paid by the customers of Petitioner, and was not paid by 
Petitioner. 
Having found that the sales and use taxes were paid by 
the customers of Petitioner, it is not material to then make a 
determination whether the sales tax would have been legally 
required to be collected and paid as tax on an admission pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated §59-12-103(1) (f), as previously stated. If 
the sales tax was collected by Petitioner from its customers, it 
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was required to remit that tax to the State of Utah, regardless of 
whether or not its collection was legally required by the statute. 
Vendors are not entitled to charge excessive taxes and then retain 
those amounts for their own use. Instead, any such claims must be 
made by the taxpayers who paid the sales and use taxes, and in this 
case, that was the purchasers of tickets for ski lifts and other 
rides at the facilities of Petitioner. 
Accordingly, in the view of the Commission, the issue of 
whether the charges of Petitioner are for an admission is a moot 
issue because the refund cannot be paid to Petitioner regardless of 
whether or not the charges were for an admission. The Commission, 
therefore, finds that Petitioner lacks the standing to request the 
refunds. 
DECISION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission finds that 
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Petitioner is not entitled to any refunds, and the claims for 
refund are therefore denied. It is so ordered. 
DATED this ? Q day ofC^QVV^J 1997. 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of a final order 
to file a Request, for Reconsideration with the Commission. If you 
do not file a Request for, Reconsideration with the Commission, you 
have thirty (30) days after the date of a final order to file a.) 
a Petition for Judicial Review in the Supreme Court, or b.) a 
Petition for Judicial Review by trial de novo in district court. 
(Utah Administrative Rule R861-1A-5(P) and Utah Code Ann. §§59-1-
601(1), 63-46b-13 et. seq.) 
GBD/ssv/94-1567.fof 
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